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I. Introduction
It is hard to dispute the role that pharmaceuticals play in modern society.
Numerous drugs have been developed that allow ailments to be treated to a degree that 
would have been unimaginable several decades ago.1  Among the groundbreaking drugs 
to be developed by various pharmaceutical companies are VIAGRA®, PROZAC®, and 
PAXIL®.  New drugs require a huge investment by pharmaceutical companies;2
however, a successful drug can potentially bring its producer billions of dollars.3 Not 
surprisingly, since a successful drug can bring its maker billions of dollars, these same 
drugs often provide the backdrop for contentious litigation.  Both PROZAC®4 and 
1 Neal Masia, The Cost of Developing a New Drug, Focus on Intellectual Property Rights, January 2006, 
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/intelprp/cost/htm.  
Advances in treating cancer, HIV/AIDS, and a broad host of other afflictions have been 
nearly continuous in recent decades, thanks to -in many instances- new drug discoveries.  
Economists estimate almost half of the increase in life expectancy achieved over the past 
15 years in the industrialized world can be attributed to new drugs.  In the United States 
alone, the economic gains from medical innovations are estimated at $500 billion per 
year.
2 Id. Neal Masia puts the cost of developing a drug at a low of $800 million to a high of $2 billion.  Masia 
also states that of 5,000 to 10,000 new chemical inventions that look promising, only 250 enter preclinical 
laboratory and animal testing.  Fewer than ten of these will show enough potential to enter Phase I human 
testing.   
3 Id.  Neal Masia states that “at the current level of reimbursement, economists estimate that only about 30 
percent of new medicines actually earn enough revenue during their patented product lifecycle to cover the 
average upfront cost of development.  If a firm incurred the average cost of drug development and only 
invented ‘average’ drugs, it would quickly go out of business.”   
4 Eli Lilly and Company v.  Barr Laboratories, et. al., 251 F.3d. 955, 968-969 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Eli Lilly 
attempted to extend its patent on Prozac by patenting a “method of blocking the uptake of serotonin by 
brain neurons in animals by administering the compound fluoextine hydrochloride.”  (U.S. Patent No. 
4,626,549 ,“the ‘549 patent”).  Fluoextine hydrochloride is the active ingredient in Prozac. Id. at 958.  
The prior art (U.S. Patent No. 4,590,213 ,“the ‘213 patent”) was directed at a method of “treating anxiety in 
a human by administering an effective amount of fluoxetine or a pharmaceutically-acceptable salt thereof.”  
Id. at 962.  Originally, the Federal Circuit invalidated the ‘549 patent on the grounds of double patenting.  
Eli Lilly v. Barr Laboratories, 222 F.3d. 973 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  The Court subsequently vacated the panel 
decision and directed a specific revision of the double patenting section.  Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d. at 958.  In its 
final opinion the Court stated that “serotonin uptake is a natural biological activity that occurs when 
fluoxetine hydrochloride is administered to an animal… [And] that it is literally impossible to treat 
someone with anxiety without at the same time inhibiting serotonin uptake.”  Id. at 969-970.  Based on this 
finding the Court found that Barr Laboratories had provided “ample foundation for the proposition that 
administration of fluoxetine hydrochloride naturally and inherently inhibits the uptake of serotonin.”  Id. at 
970.  Because humans are members of the animal genus the ‘549 patent was inherently anticipated by the 
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PAXIL®5 resulted in substantial litigation. In addition, the process that a pharmaceutical 
company must satisfy to obtain approval from the FDA to market a drug is long and 
cumbersome.6  Congress recognized that the regulatory requirements of the FDA 
shortened the commercial life of patented drugs and, by decreasing the profits of 
pharmaceutical companies, endangered future research and development.7 Based on its 
‘213 patent.  Id. at 971.  Further controversy resulted from the Court’s determination that the ‘213 was prior 
art to the ‘549 patent, despite having a later priority date.  The patent application for the ‘213 patent had 
priority from April 8, 1983 and issued on May 20, 1986.  Id.  The patent application for the ‘549 patent was 
a continuation-in-part originally filed in about April 1986 and issued in December 1986.  Id. at 968, FN 7.  
However, the ‘549 patent, as a continuation-in-part application, claimed an effective filing date of January 
10, 1974.  Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d. at 973, Newman’s dissent to refusal to reconsider the case en banc.   Despite 
this fact, the Court determined that the ‘549 patent was obvious in light of the later filed ‘213 patent.  Id. at 
968-970.  The Court was likely moved to its conclusion by the seemingly endless divisional applications, 
continuation applications and patents which arose from the original patent and, as the Court stated, “rivals 
the Hapsburg legacy.”  Id. at 959.  Newman’s dissent will be further discussed later in this paper, as she 
also notes concern for the effect that this decision could have on future patenting of biological inventions.  
Id. at 977, see pg. 5, infra.  
5 SmithKline Beecham Corp v. Apotex Corp.,  247 F.Supp.2d. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 
365 F.3d. 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004); opinion vacated  en banc,  403 F.3d. 1328 (2005);  aff’d on other grounds, 
403 F.3d. 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  The PAXIL® case provides another situation where a drug patent was 
ultimately disposed of on the basis that it was anticipated inherently by the prior art.  The PAXIL® case the 
prior art mutated into a “pseudopolymorph” that was more stable and easily manufactured.  SmithKline, 
247 F.Supp.2d. 1016-1020. The new composition was distinct from the prior art, but was discovered to 
have been created when a patient ingested the prior art.  The Federal Circuit originally invalidated the 
patent on the basis that clinical trials constituted public use.  SmithKline, 365 F.3d. at 1316-1317.  Judge 
Gajarsa, concurring, states that SmithKline should have limited its patent to “synthetic or non-naturally 
occurring” forms of the polymorph, in order prevent infringement by using the prior art.  Id. at 1332.  The 
original panel decision was subsequently vacated by the Court en banc.   The PAXIL® patent was then 
invalidated after a panel rehearing as inherently anticipated.  SmithKline, 403 F.3d. at 1344.  See, pp 49-53, 
infra.   
6 SmithKline, 247 F.Supp.2d. at 1017-1018.  Circuit Judge Posner, sitting by designation, states “Because it 
takes a long time for a new drugs to be approved by the Food and Drug Administration for sale to the 
American public, the actual period during which the producer has an exclusive right to make, use, and sell 
the drug is shorter than the statutory term of the patent.”  
7 Id.
The compression of the commercially significant patent term by reason of the regulatory 
process at the FDA is a matter of great concern to the manufacturers of new drugs.  The 
cost of developing such a drug is often very great, in part because attempts to develop a 
new drug that will be both safe and effective often fail and the cost of these ‘dry holes’ 
must be reckoned into the cost of the drugs that succeed, as it is only out of the revenues 
of those drugs that the costs of the dry holes can be recovered.  The greater the upfront 
cost of developing a product, the more time that is required to recoup the cost and so 
(other things being equal) the longer is the socially optimal patent term.  The costs 
incurred in running the gauntlet of FDA approval not only increase the manufacturer’s 
upfront development cost but compound the delay, also largely due to the FDA, between 
obtaining a patent and actually being able to market the patented drug to the consuming 
public 
(noting that a drug patented in 1977 had still not been approved for marketing to the public in 1985).  
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recognition of the unique position that pharmaceuticals play in our society, Congress 
attempted to strike a balance- through the Hatch-Waxman Act- that would guarantee the 
pharmaceutical companies a reasonable return on their investment8 while allowing 
generic drug manufacturers to quickly enter the field upon the expiration of a drug 
patent.9
Congress’ willingness to lengthen patent terms of pharmaceuticals in order to 
encourage research and development indicates patents may be treated differently when 
the public interest demands it.  The Federal Circuit’s recent determination that the 
doctrine of inherent anticipation should be aggressively applied to the patenting of 
metabolites significantly endangers the scientific advancement of pharmaceuticals.10  By 
formulating a broad rule on inherent anticipation the Federal Circuit appears to be 
directly contravening the policy choice that Congress has made, through the Hatch-
Waxman Act, relating to pharmaceutical research and development.  The Federal Circuit
is instead substituting its own policy determination in the place of Congress’.  
8 Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 268 F.3d. 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002)(quoting Abbott Labs v. 
Young, 920 F.2d. 984, 991 (D.C.Cir.1990)).  “[The] provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act ‘emerged from 
Congress’ efforts to balance two conflicting policy objectives: to induce name brand pharmaceutical firms 
to make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug products, while simultaneously 
enabling competitors to bring cheaper generic copies of those drugs to market.’”  35 U.S.C. §156 (relating 
to the patent restoration term available under the Hatch-Waxman Act to restore some of the time lost during 
the regulatory process).
9Mylan,  268 F.3d. at 1325-1326.  
An ANDA [Abbreviated New Drug Application] offers an expedited approval process for 
generic drug manufacturers.  Instead of filing a full NDA [New Drug Application] with 
new safety and efficacy studies, in an ANDA a generic drug manufacturer may rely in 
part on the pioneer manufacturer’s work by submitting data demonstrating the generic 
products’ bioequivalence with the previously approved drug.  
Portions of Hatch-Waxman relating to generic drugs codified in Title 21 U.S.C. §355.   
10 Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d. 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  This case is central to the 
debate of the application of inherent anticipation to pharmaceuticals, and its implications are discussed.   
See, pp 11-26, passim.  
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Inherent anticipation is not a new concept although, originally, it was an abstract 
concept used to address situations where the court appeared sure of the result but unsure 
of what reasoning it could use to justify that outcome.11 The evolution of inherent 
anticipation was slow, and it was not until 1945 that the Court finally set out a workable 
basic rule.  In General Electric v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp.12 the Court stated that “the 
prior art discloses the method of making the article having the characteristics of the 
patented product, though all the advantageous properties of the product had not been fully 
appreciated.”13 The Court went on to state that:
[The inventor] found latent qualities in an old discovery and adapted it to a useful end.  
But that did not advance the frontiers of science in this narrow field so as to satisfy the 
exacting standards of our patent system.  Where there has been use of an article or where 
the method of its manufacture is known, more than a new advantage of the product must 
be discovered in order to claim invention.14
11 See e.g. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711(1880) (holding that whether Tilghman’s process of 
distilling fat acid had been practiced before by others was immaterial in determining whether he was 
entitled to a patent).  Paul Galloway, Inherently Difficult Analysis for Inherent and Accidental 
Biotechnological Inventions, Suffolk U. L. Rev., 38 SFKULR 73, 77-78 (2004)(stating that the process had 
been practiced when tallow was introduced as lubrication for the piston in the machine, the formation of fat 
acid in the machine was unintended and not understood.  This situation is now seen as “accidental 
anticipation” and is distinct from “inherent anticipation” because the result is not necessarily present within 
the invention, method, or process).    See also, Edison Electric v. Novelty Incandescent Lamp Co., 167 F. 
977 (3rd Cir. 1909)(finding that a patent was not barred for a new and preferable light bulb.  The bulb had 
been previously built, but the construction was accidental and those bulbs were discarded as being 
defective, so the true value of the invention was not discovered until Edison recognized and patented it, so 
the patent was valid).  
12 General Electric v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242 (1945).  This case concerned the frosting 
of light bulbs.  Clear light bulbs produced unpleasant glare.  One method to address glare was to frost the 
outside of the bulb; however, this frosting became easily dirty and was difficult to clean.  The natural 
alternative was to frost the inside of the bulb, but this substantially weakened the bulb, almost to the point 
that it was unfit for use.  Pipkin, the inventor in this case, found that a second treatment of frost made the 
bulb stronger by eating away the crevices created by the first layer of frost.  This treatment had been 
discovered many years earlier and was known to give glass a rounded, as opposed to angular and creviced, 
finish.  What had not been discovered was that a second finish ate away at some of original frosting and 
would actually strengthen the bulb.  This phenomenon was referred to as “Pipkin’s paradox” and was the 
basis of his patent application.  Ultimately, the court found his discovery insufficient for a patent. 
13 Id. at 248 (quoting Lovell Mfg. Co. v. Cary, 147 U.S. 623).  
14 Id. at 248-249.  
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The question raised by the GE case above is to what degree it should be applied to
biological inventions.15  Does the stringent test recited above, and largely adopted by the 
Federal Circuit in Schering v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals and SmithKline Beecham v. 
Apotex, protect the public by ensuring that pharmaceuticals, and their accompanying 
metabolites, pass to the public domain as soon as possible; or does the Schering decision 
pose a threat to scientific advancement by forcing pharmaceuticals to disclose their 
inventions in order to obtain patent protection, but limiting their ability to claim 
metabolites caused by their products, even if they could not have recognized the benefits 
of their invention prior to the patent’s critical date?
The rule enunciated in Schering is a new interpretation of the previous case law 
concerning inherent anticipation.  The Federal Circuit’s new view- that inherency no 
longer requires recognition of the trait by a “person having ordinary skill in the art”
(PHOSITA) - applies to any situation where one is attempting to gain a patent for a 
derivative result of a previous patent.  However, the effects of this new rule will felt most 
in the pharmaceutical industry.  There is a danger that, by not requiring recognition by 
PHOSITA to apply the doctrine of inherent anticipation, the ability to patent pre-existing 
unrecognized biological inventions could be imperiled, regardless of the individual utility 
that may be garnered from these substances once their value is recognized. 
Judge Pauline Newman of the Federal Circuit expressed her concern that the 
Federal Circuit, in 2001, was adopting bright line rules which, by precluding protection 
15 Metabolites form when an “ingested pharmaceutical compound undergoes a chemical conversion in the 
digestive tract to form a new metabolite compound.”  Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1375.  Biological inventions 
are similar to metabolites, but the processes that lead to biological compositions are not limited to the 
digestive tract.  Metabolites are merely a specific form of biological invention.
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for many metabolites, would stifle the advancement of biological inventions.  Judge 
Newman stated:
[E]very biological property is the natural and inherent result of the chemical structure 
from which it arises, whether or not it has been discovered.  To negate the patentability of 
a discovery of biological activity because it is ‘the natural result’ of the chemical 
compound can have powerful consequences for the patentability of biological 
inventions.16
The decision in Schering was the culminating case in a lengthy split within the 
Federal Circuit.  One view, espoused most forcefully by Judge Newman in Continental 
Can Company v. Monsanto,17 states that patenting should only be prevented if a “person 
having ordinary skill in the art” could have recognized the inherent trait that was now 
being claimed.18  Judge Randall Rader explicitly disavowed any such notion in 
Schering.19 Judge Newman believes that more lenient and clear standards, with respect 
to the patenting of pharmaceutical and biological inventions, are necessary in light of the 
16 Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d. at 976.  
17 Continental Can v. Monsanto, 948 F.2d. 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
18 Id. at 1269.  Judge Newman wrote:
[T]o serve as anticipation when the reference is silent about the asserted inherent 
characteristic, such a gap must be filled with recourse to extrinsic evidence.  Such 
evidence must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the 
thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of 
ordinary skill. 
19 Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1377.  Judge Rader stated that “recognition by a person of ordinary skill in the art 
before the critical date [of the patent] is not required to show anticipation by inherency.”  He went on to 
further state that: 
Continental Can does not stand for the proposition that an inherent feature of a prior art 
reference must be perceived as such by a person of ordinary skill in the art before the 
critical date.  In Continental Can this court vacated summary judgment of anticipation of 
claims reciting a plastic bottle with hollow ribs over a prior art disclosing a plastic bottle.  
The record contained conflicting expert testimony about whether the ribs of the prior art 
plastic bottle were solid.  Given the material fact, this court vacated summary judgment 
as improper. 
Id.  Judge Rader did sit on the panel that ruled on Continental Can, but Judge Newman, the author of the 
Continental Can opinion would likely disagree with his view of that case, see FN 18, supra.  Subsequently, 
Judge Newman lamented the Circuit’s refusal to hear the Schering case en banc and stated “no precedent 
supports the position that a product whose existence was not previously known and is not in the prior art is 
always unpatentable on the grounds that it existed undiscovered.”  She went further and quoted her 
language of Continental Can, noted in FN 18, supra, which required recognition of the inherent 
characteristic by PHOSITA.  Schering v. Geneva, 348 F.3d. 992, 993-995 (Fed. Cir. 2003), dissent to 
denial of rehearing en banc.    
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unpredictability of the breakthroughs that various discoveries may bring,20 but in 
Schering, the Federal Circuit, led by Judge Randall Rader, adopted a clear position which 
sets extremely stringent standards for the patenting of metabolites and other biologicals.21
This paper will examine the split that had developed within the Federal Circuit 
concerning whether it is necessary that there be recognition by PHOSITA in order to 
apply the doctrine of inherent anticipation.  It will then argue that Congress, through the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments, has already recognized that pharmaceuticals occupy a 
uniquely important position within society; and, based upon that, it is necessary that 
pharmaceutical and biological inventions be given different treatment when applying 
inherent anticipation to prevent the stifling of scientific advancement which may 
otherwise occur.  Finally, some suggestions will be made on how pharmaceutical 
companies can be protected, to ensure that they maintain sufficient incentives to continue 
to engage in the research and development of new drugs, including investigation of the 
biological causes of existing compositions; but, at the same time, the suggestions will 
attempt to remove as little as necessary from the public domain.  
II. Inherent Anticipation
Patents that relate to metabolites must meet all the basic requirements of 
patentability.22  Among the most basic requirements are that an invention be useful,23
novel24, and non-obvious.25  Anticipation under §102(a) occurs if the identical invention 
20 Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d. at 976.  
21 Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1381.  Judge Rader allowed for the patenting of metabolites with “proper 
claiming.” This, of course, would require that the metabolite be recognized prior to the patent’s critical 
date, which is a difficult proposition given that it may be the state of technology which prevents such 
recognition.  He also stated that the metabolite could be patented in its “pure and isolated form … or as a 
pharmaceutical carrier.”
22 35 U.S.C. §§101-103 (2005).
23 35 U.S.C. §101 (2005).
24 35 U.S.C. §102 (2005).
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has been claimed on a single prior art reference.26 When more than one prior art 
reference is required to find unpatentability, or patentability revolves around a minor 
improvement of the prior art, then the validity of the patent is evaluated for obviousness 
under §103.27 In some cases, a prior art reference may anticipate if all the claimed
limitations are not disclosed within the prior art but are deemed to be inherent within it.28
As Judge Rader said in Atlas Powder v. Ireco Inc., “under the principles of inherency, if 
the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed 
limitations, it anticipates.”29 Anticipation is a factual determination30 that will prevent 
patenting.31  If a patent has already been issued then anticipation must be shown by clear 
and convincing evidence, but if this burden is met the patent will be invalidated.32
The doctrine of inherent anticipation is an off-shot of accidental anticipation.  
Accidental anticipation was first addressed by the Supreme Court in Tilghman v. 
Proctor.33  In that case the Court found that Tilghman’s invention for separating fats and 
oils was not anticipated because it had only been practiced accidentally and the results, 
and benefits, were not understood.34  This accidental use had occurred when individuals 
practicing the prior art introduced tallow to help lubricate the piston on a steam 
cylinder.35  The Court stated that the “acids were accidentally and unwittingly produced, 
25 35 U.S.C. §103 (2005).
26 Continental Can, 948 F.2d. at 1267 (citing Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Banner, 778 F.2d. 775, 
780 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist and Derrick Co., 730 F.2d. 
1452, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
27 Id.  
28 Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d. 628, 630 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  
29 Atlas Powder v. Ireco Co. of Cal., 190 F.3d. 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  
30 Standard Havens v. Gencor Industries, 953 F.2d. 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Ralston Purina Co. 
v Far-Mar-Co., 772 F.2d. 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
31 Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d. at 1347 (citing Titanium Metals, 778 F.2d. at 782).  
32 Id.  35 U.S.C. §282. 
33 Tilghman, 102 U.S. 707.  See FN 11, supra.  
34 Id. at 711.
35 Id. 
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whilst the operators were in pursuit of other and different results, without exciting 
attention and without its even being known what was done or how it had been done, it 
would be absurd to say it was an anticipation of Tilghman’s discovery.”36  The Court’s 
determination that the situation in Tilghman did not qualify as anticipation makes sense, 
but the explanation seems to center on the previous producer’s failure to appreciate what 
had occurred through their actions.37  Future cases added to the Tilghman  decision; and,
today, Tilghman and cases following its fact pattern are described as being cases of 
“accidental anticipation.”38 Tilghman continues to be valid law, although the
circumstances that lead to a finding of accidental anticipation do not appear common.
Courts have long treated inherent anticipation and accidental anticipation as being
distinct from one another.39 Judge Rader distinguished Tilghman from Schering by 
36 Id. at 711-712.  
37 Id.
38 Paul Galloway has outlined the factors that the Federal Circuit, and its predecessor the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals, have considered in determining whether “inherent anticipation” or “accidental 
anticipation” applies to certain sets of facts. The factors he recites are: 
1) whether the prior art intended the claimed process; 2) whether the prior art includes 
knowledge of the claimed composition or process; 3) whether the prior art includes 
knowledge of the newly discovered result of the claimed process or knowledge of the 
newly discovered function of the claimed composition; 4) whether the prior art includes 
knowledge of the claimed component in the claimed composition; 5) whether the prior art 
performs the claimed process or makes or uses the claimed composition for a different 
purpose; 6) whether the claimed composition is useful in the prior art; 7) whether the 
claimed material is useful to achieve the claimed result in the prior art and; 8) whether the 
claimed process performs occasionally or under unusual conditions in the prior art or the 
claimed composition is formed occasionally or under unusual conditions.
Galloway, 38 SFKULR at 91.  Accidental anticipation is differentiated from inherent anticipation in that 
the result, in inherent anticipation, is the naturally occurring and inevitable result of practicing the prior art.  
A determination that accidental anticipation exists allows for patenting; whereas a finding of inherent 
anticipation precludes patenting.  
39 See e.g., The American Original Corp. v. Jenkins Food Corp., 696 F.2d. 1053 (4th Cir. 1982)(finding that 
a patent to eviscerate clams using a “shearing hydraulic force” was valid and had only been accidentally 
anticipated by the prior art, whose use of hydraulic force was incidental); But see, Bird Provision Co. v. 
Owens Country Sausage, Inc., 568 F.2d. 369 (5th Cir. 1978)(finding that a method to “hot process” pork 
sausage to lengthen shelf life was anticipated by prior art, even though the prior art did not recognize the 
implications to shelf life).  See also, Galloway, 38 SFKULR at 77-80, development of the doctrines of 
inherent anticipation and accidental anticipation.  The Bird case also presents the opportunity to pose an 
interesting inherent anticipation hypothetical unrelated to pharmaceuticals:  assume that a chemical was 
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noting that the claimed process from Tilghman was not found to be inevitably present in 
the prior art.40  He then concluded that since the claimed metabolite was inherently 
present whenever loratadine was ingested, the sale of loratadine resulted in the sale of the 
patented metabolite; and, regardless of whether there was recognition by PHOSITA, 
invalidity due to inherent anticipation was applicable.41
Inherent anticipation requires that an event inevitably follow.42  As the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals stated in In Re Oelrich, “inherency … may not be 
established by probabilities or possibilities.  The mere fact that a certain thing may result 
from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.”43  The Court went on to state that if it 
is shown that the “natural result flowing from the operation as taught [in the prior art to 
PHOSITA] would result in the performance of the questioned function, it seems to be 
well settled that the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.”44  Allowing a patent for 
unknowingly produced by the “hot process” but never recognized, and, years later, a new method was 
created that substantially lengthened the shelf life of pork by creating that same chemical (apparently an 
impressive feat), but this time the chemical was detected.  If the company that discovered the new process 
patented both the process and the resulting chemical could a competitor invalidate the patent on the 
chemical because it was inherently anticipated by the prior art “hot process.”  Under Schering and 
SmithKline, the answer is almost certainly “yes” since the undetected chemical would be inherent, but 
undetected, within the prior art.  This could make many companies balk when considering whether to 
obtain a patent or retain a method as a trade secret.  
40 Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1378.
41 Id.  Judge Rader appears somewhat uncertain if the basis of the Schering decision will be accepted, as 
demonstrated by his attempts in the opinion to distinguish Tilghman and find no need for recognition by 
PHOSITA.  For example, he states: “Applying an inherency principle in the context of an on sale bar under 
35 U.S.C. §102(b), this court has distinguished Eibel and Tilghman,” Id. Several sentences later, after 
summarizing several additional cases, Judge Rader says: 
In those cases the product sold or offered for sale had an inherent, but unrecognized 
feature that was a limitation of the asserted claims.  Thus, this court has distinguished 
Eibel and Tilghman, which therefore do not bind this court to find no anticipation 
because skilled artisans did not recognize that the prior art ‘233 patent inherently 
produced the claimed invention. 
  Id.
42 In Re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578 (C.C.P.A. 1981).  
43 Id. at 581 (emphasis added), (citing Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d. 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939).  
44 Id.  (emphasis added).
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a claim that is inherent within the prior art has the practical effect of removing that claim 
from the public domain, at least for the duration of a new patent.45
The Supreme Court touched more clearly on inherent anticipation in the case of 
General Electric v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co.46  In that case the court made clear that 
more than the mere discovery of a “new advantage” to an existing product is required in 
order to obtain a patent.47 In that case the inventor, Pipkin, discovered that a second 
treatment of frost, inside the bulb, actually strengthens the bulb by dissolving away 
additional glass which would otherwise weaken the bulb.48 The Court did not believe 
that Pipkin’s advancement warranted patent protection.49 However, the Court did leave 
open the possibility that the discovery of a new quality, which does advance the science 
in a narrow field, could be entitled to a patent.50  But, absent such advancement, the 
public is merely being deprived of a good for an additional patent term.51
Public policy considerations best explain why the Federal Circuit adopted such a 
hardline in Schering and SmithKline.  The Federal Circuit’s concern is that permitting the 
consecutive patenting of pharmaceuticals, and later of their in vivo biological by-
45 Application of Roy Wiseman, Jr., 596. F.2d. 1019, 1023 (C.C.P.A. 1979).  
46 General Electric, 326 U.S. 242, see FN 12 supra, for facts.    
47 Id. at 248-249.
48 Id. at 244-245.
49 Id. at 248-249.
50 Id.  
51 The test espoused by Judge Newman in Continental Can and derived from previous cases was meant to 
address the concerns of undeserved patent extensions.  The requirements for inherency to be triggered were 
that 1) the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference and 2) it 
would be so recognized by persons having ordinary skill in the art.  Continental Can, 948 F.2d. at 1268.
The first portion of the test attempts to distinguish accidental anticipation from inherent anticipation.  As a 
threshold matter, accidental anticipation may not bar a patent since the public has not derived benefit from 
the discovery.  Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 711; see also, Eibel, 261 U.S. at 66.  The second portion of the test 
addresses the fact that it a thing is inherently present in a prior art reference but not recognized then it is 
most likely not obvious and its discovery could provide the “[advancement of] the frontiers of science in [a] 
narrow field” that the Supreme Court alluded to in General Electric, 326 U.S. at 248-249.  The second 
portion of the test also prevents claims that, while appearing to advance science in a narrow field, are 
known to technologists in the field but not to Judges, Continental Can, 948 F.2d. at 1269.   
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products, would have the practical result of substantially lengthening the patent 
protection of the pharmaceutical, as well as preventing the creation of other 
pharmaceuticals that may metabolize into the same biological composition, without 
substantially advancing the present frontiers of science.  
A.  Schering Corporation v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals
The Schering case concerned two patents.52 The first was (U.S. Patent No. 
4,282,233, “the ‘233 patent”).53  The ‘233 patent covered loratadine, the active ingredient
in an antihistamine marketed by Schering under the brand name CLARITIN®.54
CLARITIN® was unique in the marketplace at the time it was launched because it was an 
antihistamine that did not cause drowsiness.55 The ‘233 patent issued in 1981 and had 
expired by the time the Federal Circuit considered the case.56  The second patent at issue 
in the case was (U.S. Patent No. 4,659,716 ,“the ‘716 patent”).57  The ‘716 patent covered 
a metabolite of loratadine called descarboethoxyloratadine (DCL), which is also a non-
drowsy antihistamine.58  Metabolites form when an “ingested pharmaceutical undergoes a 
chemical conversion [during the course of] the digestive process to form a new 
metabolite compound.”59  The ‘716 patent issued in April 1987 and was set to expire in 
April 2004.60 Numerous generic drug manufacturers sought to market generic versions 
of loratadine once the ‘233 patent had expired, but were required to assert that the ‘716 
patent was invalid or not infringed by their practice of the ‘233 patent because of 
52 Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 339 F.3d. 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
53 Id. at 1374.
54 Id. at 1375.  
55 Id.
56 Id.  
57 Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1374.  
58 Id. at 1375. 
59 Id. 
60 Id.  
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Schering’s listing of the ‘716 patent in the “Orange Book” in connection with the ‘233 
patent.61
Since the earliest priority date of the ‘716 patent was February 15, 1984, the ‘233 
patent was prior art over the ‘716 patent.62 After cross-motions for summary judgment 
the District Court invalidated the ‘716 patent as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. 
§102(b) because DCL was “necessarily formed as a metabolite by carrying out the 
process disclosed in the ‘233 patent.”63  Schering appealed the District Court’s decision.  
Judge Rader authored the opinion in Schering and took full advantage of the 
opportunity to lay out the exacting standards to apply when evaluating a patent under the 
doctrine of inherent anticipation.  He started by making clear that prior art “may 
61 Id. at 1376;  SmithKline v. Apotex, et.al.,  Federal Trade Commission Amicus Curie Concerning 
Torpharm’s Cross Motion for Entry as an Amended Order, 2003 WL 22023358 (E.D. Pa.).  Once an NDA 
is approved the patents related to it are submitted with the NDA and listed.  Later, any new patent 
information relating to the approved drug is submitted to the FDA and listed in the “Orange Book.”  To be 
listed, the patent must contain at least one valid product or use claim.  However, once the patents are listed, 
any filing of an ANDA approval for a drug that involves a listed patent will automatically trigger a 30 
month stay.  During this time the FDA may not approve a drug unless the litigation is concluded sooner in 
favor of the ANDA applicant.  The Orange Book registration has proven problematic because the FDA has 
stated that it lacks the expertise and resources to scrutinize the listed patents; and must therefore treat its 
role in Orange Book listings as purely ministerial, so there should be no presumption that a patent was 
correctly listed.  Drug Manufacturers have proven adept at manipulating the Orange Book system to their 
advantage.  Among the methods that Drug Manufacturers have used to prevent the entry of generic drugs 
into the marketplace is the listing of later issued patents in the Orange Book after a suit has been 
commenced.  This results in either consecutive or overlapping stays that prevent the FDA from considering 
the ANDA.  The FTC singled out SmithKline’s orange book listings in relation to PAXIL® as being 
particularly egregious.   Apotex filed an ANDA in March of 1998.  At the time SmithKline had only one 
patent listed in the Orange Book for PAXIL®.  After Apotex commenced its suit an additional eight patents 
were filed in the Orange Book at staggered intervals.  Based on these additional filings SmithKline was 
able to extend its original 30 month stay to a 65 month stay, which was finally set to expire in September of 
2003, assuming SmithKline listed no additional patents in the Orange Book.)  The Paxil Patent was finally 
disposed of by the Federal Circuit in SmithKline Beecham Corp v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d. 1306; opinion 
vacated en banc, 403 F.3d. 1328; aff’d on other grounds; 403 F.3d. 1331.  The problem of Orange Book 
listings is further complicated by the Federal Circuit’s rulings in Andrx Pharmaceticals v. Biovail Corp., 
276 F.3d. 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001); and Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 268 F.3d. 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2002).  In these cases the Federal Circuit determined that district courts lacked the power to shorten the 30 
month stay and that individuals lacked the ability to commence a private action to require pharmaceuticals 
to take steps to de-list patents from the Orange Book, even after those patents had been found to be invalid.  
Andrx, 276 F.3d. at 1376; Mylan, 268 F.3d. at 1324, 1330-1333.    
62 Schering, 339 F.3d at 1376.
63 Id.   Schering Corporation v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals , 2002 WL 20001552 (D. N.J. 2002).  
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anticipate without disclosing every feature of the claimed invention if that missing 
characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.”64
Rader then stated “[a]t the outset, this Court rejects the contention that inherent 
anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”65 This is a striking determination 
because numerous cases, including Continental Can, appear to stand for the proposition 
that an anticipating reference must be recognized by PHOSITA to be inherently 
anticipated.66 In rejecting this view, Judge Rader attempts to distinguish Continental Can
as a summary judgment determination where disputed material facts made any inherent 
anticipation analysis premature.67 However, Judge Rader’s attempt to minimize the reach 
of Continental Can is unconvincing, based on the clear view expressed by Judge 
Newman in that case.  
Judge Newman, the author of the Continental Can opinion, stated that for inherent 
anticipation to apply “the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing 
described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary 
skill” (emphasis added).68  She found this flexible rule to be necessary to prevent 
continuing patents for matters that were outside the knowledge of judges, but not 
necessarily the knowledge of those skilled in the art.69  Summary judgment in the 
64 Id. at 1377.
65 Id.
66 Continental Can, 948 F.2d. at 1269.  
67 Id.  
68 Continental Can, 948 F.2d at 1269.  See also, FN 18 and 19, supra.
69 Id.  Judge Newman’s primary concern appeared to be that technologists in the field would omit basic 
facts as unnecessary to a reference.  It could then be possible for an opportunist to attempt to take 
advantage of this omission in order to claim something that was already known at the time of patenting, but 
not expressly included in the reference.  Newman’s later decisions, such as those in Elan Pharmaceuticals 
v. Mayo Foundation and her dissent to the Circuit’s refusal to hear Schering en banc, make clear that it was 
never her intent to preclude all material present from being foreclosed by inherent anticipation.  A cursory 
reading of Continental Can, where she says “If, however, the disclosure is sufficient to show that the 
natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result in the performance of the questioned 
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Continental Can case was ultimately reversed because the Federal Circuit found that 
there were questions as to whether the process necessarily produced the hollow ribs
claimed.70 However, according to Judge Newman’s framing of the issue, had there been 
no question that the process in Continental Can inevitably and always produced hollow 
ribs, the Court would still have had to determine whether PHOSITA would have 
recognized the hollow ribs in order to uphold a summary judgment of anticipation by 
inherency.71 Thus, Judge Rader’s view of the limited importance of Continental Can 
does not seem to be supported by Judge Newman’s statement of its holding and rationale.
It is also possible that Judge Rader may have violated the Federal Circuit’s local rules by 
overruling a binding precedent in a panel decision.72
function, it seems well settled the disclosure should be sufficient,” could leave an incorrect impression if 
taken out of its context.
70 Id.
71 Since the Court did not reach the issue of whether PHOSITA would have recognized the presence of the 
trait in the reference, the test in Continental Can is technically dicta, however it is supported by a host of 
cases both preceding it, and preceding Schering, MEHL/Biophile, Atlas Powder, and EMI Group, that treat 
Continental Can  as binding.  See e.g., Rosco Corp. v.Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d. 1373, 1380-1381 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002)(finding that PHOSITA would not read the reference as inherently creating a mirror of varying 
radius);  Finnegan Corporation v. ITC, 180 F.3d. 1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999)(holding that one skilled in 
the art would not necessarily recognize the “nonresonance ejection” disclosed in the prior art and therefore 
the patent is not anticipated); In Re Robertson, 169 F.3d. 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999)(holding that the Board 
in rejecting a patent failed to show that the disclosed diaper fasteners were either necessary or would have 
been recognized by an artisan of ordinary skill); In Re Paulsen, 30 F.3d. 1475, 1480-1481 (Fed. Cir. 
1994)(holding that a prior art reference must be considered together with the knowledge of one skilled in 
the art and, after doing so, the claim is anticipated); In Re Spada, 911 F.2d. 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(Judge 
Newman stating the claim is anticipated because the prior art “put one of ordinary skill in possession” of 
the claims.); In Re Oelrich, 666 F.2d. 578, 581-582 (Fed. Cir. 1981)(holding that if the disclosure is 
sufficient to show that the claim is the natural result flowing from the operation taught [to PHOSITA] then 
the disclosure is sufficient); In Re Shetty, 566 F.2d. 81, 84-85 (C.C.P.A. 1977)(finding that PHOSITA 
would not have recognized that prior art method to combat microbial infections also inhibited appetite and 
the patent is not anticipated); In Re Seaborg, 328 F.2d. 996, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1964)(finding that creation of 
element 95 would require more skill than possessed by PHOISTA and is therefore not anticipated);   see 
also Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 26 CCPA 937 (C.C.P.A. 1939); Cf. Telmac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, 247 
F.3d. 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001)(holding that an algorithm for “real time call debiting” was anticipated but 
citing to Continental Can, Atlas Powder, and MEHL/Biophile despite their different requirements relating 
to PHOSITA recognition).  
72Fed. Cir. R. 35(a)(2).   
Arguing to a panel to overrule a precedent.  Although only the court en banc may 
overrule a binding precedent, a party may argue, in its brief and oral argument, to 
overrule a binding precedent without petitioning for hearing en banc.  The panel will 
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Judge Rader continued, in his Schering opinion, to describe how he 
believed that the issue presented was one of first impression.73  In Schering the court was 
asked to find anticipation based not on the absence of a single limitation, but rather upon 
the absence of an entire structure from the prior art.74 The enormity of the item that 
would have to be found to be anticipated inherently did not trouble Judge Rader.  Rather, 
he dispensed with any concerns about finding a whole structure inherently anticipated by 
explaining that:
inherency places subject matter in the public domain as well as an express disclosure, the 
inherent disclosure of the entire claimed subject matter anticipates as well as inherent 
disclosure of a single feature of the claimed subject matter.  The extent of the inherent 
disclosure does not limit its anticipatory effect.75
He went on to state that a “‘natural result flowing from’ the explicit disclosure of the 
prior art” is normally sufficient to find inherency.76
decide whether to ask the regular active judges to consider hearing the case en banc.  
(emphasis added).  
At this point in time there was already conflicting case law as to whether recognition by PHOSITA was 
required.  Continental Can and its precursors developed the rule that required recognition by PHOSITA.  
On the other side of the argument were Atlas Powder v. Ireco  Inc., 190 F.3d. 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
MEHL/Biophile International, 192 F.3d. 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999); EMI Group, 268 F.3d. 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
2001).  These cases do not require recognition by PHOSITA.  However the requirement for recognition by 
PHOSITA, while minimized and distinguished by the second line of cases, was not expressly disavowed 
until Schering.  Incidentally, the three cases that supported the concept that inherent anticipation did not 
require recognition by PHOSITA were all authored by Judge Rader in panel decisions, and the oldest case 
pre-dated Schering by only four years.  Further complicating matters was the fact that Judge Newman 
expressly rejected the view that there was no need for recognition by PHOSITA to apply inherent 
anticipation in Elan Pharmaceuticals v. Mayo Foundation, 304 F.3d. 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2002), opinion 
vacated en banc and remanded, 314 F.3d. 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 346 F.3d. 1051 
(Fed. Cir. 2003).  Rather than resolving en banc the issue of whether recognition by PHOSITA is required, 
the Court merely vacated Judge Newman’s decision and remanded it back to her panel.  While this appears 
to be a rejection of Judge Newman’s view, it is not the equivalent of the en banc hearing required by 
Federal Circuit Rule 35(a)(2).         
73 Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1378.  Shepard’s views Continental Can as being of questionable validity.  
74 Id. at 1379.
75 Id. 
76 Id. (citing Eli Lilly v. Barr Labs, 251 F.3d. 955, 977).  The Eli Lilly case is of questionable value here.  In 
that case Eli Lilly tried to extend its patent on the active ingredient in Prozac by claiming a method of 
blocking serotonin uptake in animals.  Previously, Eli Lilly claimed a way to treat anxiety in humans which 
would naturally block serotonin uptake.  The Court originally invalidated the newer patent on the basis of 
double patenting.  A revised opinion found inherent anticipation since humans are part of the animal genus 
and claiming a patentably non distinct treatment for a genus member, when the same treatment has been 
claimed for a species member, renders that claim inherently anticipated.  It is clear in that case that Eli Lilly 
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In an attempt to distinguish the Schering case from other precedent, Judge Rader 
found that, based on the record, DCL would have been detectable after ingestion of 
loratadine by humans.77  As a result the ‘233 patent was found to have enabled the 
production of loratadine.78  Judge Rader stated that to be enabling the ‘233 patent need 
“only describe how to make DCL in any form encompassed by a compound claim 
covering DCL, e.g., DCL as a metabolite in a patient’s body.”79  In this case, the direction 
in the ‘233 patent to administer loratadine to a patient was sufficient to enable a 
PHOSITA to create DCL.80 For that reason, the ‘716 patent claims on DCL were
inherently anticipated by the ‘233 patent for loratadine.81
Judge Rader did allow for limited patenting of metabolites.82  The types of patents 
that he stated were still possible despite the Schering holding were patents for the pure 
and isolated form of a metabolite, in pharmaceutical compositions with pharmaceutically 
acceptable carriers, or for a method of administering the metabolite or pharmaceutical 
probably recognized that the claims were duplicative, but there was a question as to the order of the priority 
of the patents.  See FN 4, supra.  However, the Eli Lilly case is a good example of the type of behavior that 
Judge Rader seemed most concerned with when he issued his ruling in Schering.  
77 Id.  Contra, In Re Seaborg, 328 F.2d. 996 (1964).  Claims involving an isotope of americium were 
permitted, despite the fact that they would have been present in the Fermi reactor many years prior. 
However, they would not have been detectable and its presence was merely theoretical.  Judge Rader’s 
view is confusing since it does appear to place some importance on recognition, but does not place 
importance on whether recognition occurred when the original patent issued, or whether the recognition 
was actually the impetus for the new patent.  Schering’s counsel also took issue with Judge Rader’s view 
that DCL would have been detectable upon ingestion of loratadine.  In his combined petition for panel 
rehearing and rehearing en banc Schering’s states that Schering had to “develop new, more sensitive testing 
methods to detect DCL and other metabolites of the ‘233 patent compounds.”  Comined Petition for Panel 
Rehearing and Rehearing en banc by Plaintiff-Appellant, 2003 WL 24033460 at 5-6.
78 Schering.  339 F.3d. at 1380-1381.
79 Id. at 1381.
80 Id. at 1381.
81 Id. at 1380.  Rader also cites to the patent principle that “that which would literally infringe if later in 
time, anticipates if earlier.”  
82 Id. at 1381.  Judge Rader’s statement regarding continuing patentability of metabolites was dicta in this 
case.  Judge Rader did not believe that Schering was entitled to any additional patents since Schering 
attempted to claim “bare chemical compound.”
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composition.83  However, the decision made clear that metabolites may not have 
protection for broad compound claims because such claims are anticipated by the 
pharmaceutical composition which causes them.84  Essentially, what Judge Rader
attempted to accomplish with his decision in Schering was to settle the lingering dispute 
within the Federal Circuit of whether inherent anticipation could apply to a situation 
where there was no recognition by PHOSITA.85
Other members of the court recognized the implications of Judge Rader’s decision 
and objected to the potential effects that it would have on both the patenting of 
metabolites, and the status of the Federal Circuit’s case law for inherent anticipation.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, Judge Newman was the most vociferous in her opposition to 
83 Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1381. 
84 Id.  
85 The confusion within the Circuit appears to be largely due to three previous panel decisions authored by 
Judge Rader.  In Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d. 1342; MEHL/Biophile, 192. F.3d. 1362; and EMI Group North 
America, 268 F.3d. 1342. The decisions in Atlas and MEHL/Biophile were issued three weeks apart from 
one another in late 1999.  Judge Rader attempted limit the circumstances where recognition by PHOSITA 
would be required by stating in EMI Group that such recognition 
may be sensible for claims that recite limitations of structure, compositions of matter, and 
method steps which could be inherently found in prior art.  Such recognition by one of 
ordinary skill in the art may be important for establishing that the descriptive matter 
would inherently exist in every combination of the claims limitation … [t]heoretical 
mechanisms or rules of natural law that are recited in a claim, that are not themselves 
patentable, however, do not need to be recognized by one having ordinary skill in the art 
for a finding of inherency.  A person of ordinary skill does not have to recognize that a 
method or structure behaves according to fully and effectively practice the method or 
structure.   
EMI, 268 F.3d. at 1350-1351.  This portion of the EMI Group decision was, until Schering, Judge Rader’s 
most bold attempt to alter the rule of inherent anticipation.  It’s unclear where his distinction between 
structure, composition of matter, and method steps as compared to “natural law” comes from.  It is true that 
natural law cannot be patented, although the Supreme Court is currently considering what limitations may 
exist when a party actually discovers a natural law that leads to an accompanying correlation (Laboratory 
Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, No. 04-607, oral arguments heard March 21, 
2006, see FN 267, infra).  However, Judge Rader held in both Schering and SmithKline v. Apotex, 403 
F.3d. 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005) that when natural processes lead to otherwise patentable material, that material 
may not be patented if it existed in the prior art, even if such existence was undiscovered and unrelated to 
the utility of the drug.   
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both the Schering decision and the decision not to hear it en banc.86  Judge Newman did 
not accept Judge Rader’s view on the law of inherent anticipation or approve of how the 
new precedent was created.87
I write to state my concern for the panel’s departure from the established law of 
anticipation.  The court holds “anticipated” a novel chemical compound (DCL), a 
compound not known to the prior art and that did not previously exist.  The Schering 
inventor discovered it in vivo as a degradation product of loratadine, isolated it, 
determined its structure, and found its biologic properties.  The panel nonetheless holds 
that this new compound is unpatentable on the ground of “inherent anticipation”…The 
law is that a product is “anticipated” if it is not new.  Conversely, it is not anticipated if it 
is new.  A new product may of course be unpatentable based on obviousness, but it is not 
subject to unpatentability for lack of novelty.  No precedent supports the position that a 
product whose existence was not previously known and is not in the prior art is always 
unpatentable on the ground that it existed undiscovered.  If the law is to be changed in 
this direction it must be done en banc.88
Judge Newman cautioned that the panel’s decision may have a dire impact on the 
discovery of biological patents.89  Her primary concern about the substantive affects of 
the Schering decision is that there is no longer incentive for pharmaceuticals to invest in 
the research and development of metabolites that cannot be patented.90 She also viewed 
86 Schering v. Geneva, 348 F.3d. 992, dissent to decision not to rehear en banc.  Federal Circuit Rule 
35(a)(2) states that “only the court en banc may overrule a binding precedent.”  A party may argue before a 
panel to overrule a binding precedent, but, before overruling a binding precedent, the panel must decide 
whether to take a poll of the active Judges.  If a majority of the active Judges choose to hear the matter en 
banc, then the decision may be reviewed en banc as dictated in Federal Circuit Rule 35(a)(1).  Judge 
Newman recognized that the Schering decision, when taken together with Atlas Powder, Mehl/Biophile, 
and EMI Group, had the practical result of overruling Continental Can without first holding an en banc 
hearing.    
87 Id. at 993.
88 Id.  See Fed. Cir. R. 35(a)(2).
89 Id. at 994.
90 Id.  The Washington Legal Foundation filed an amicus curiae brief in support of SmithKline petition for 
a writ of certiorari.  In their brief they state their concern that the rule of Schering will not protect material 
in the public domain, as Rader wants, but rather stifle innovation.  The foundation states that the best way 
to increase the flow of useful information is to provide patents that protect the discovery of previously 
existing, but unappreciated, compositions.  Washington Legal Foundation’s Amicus Curiae Brief in 
Support of Petitioners, 2005 WL 3114487 at 8.  The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America also filed an amicus curiae in support of SmithKline’s petition for certiorari.  They too stated a 
concern that the SmithKline rule would negate any potential incentive to investigate the beneficial uses of 
existing materials.  They also gave an example of the new rule’s shortcomings.  They state that a broad 
spectrum antibiotic tetracycline was developed by studying Auremycin, a pre-existing antibiotic.  The 
Federal Circuit allowed for the patenting of this newly discovered substance in Glaxo v. NovoPharm, 52 
F.3d. 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Amicus Curiae Brief 
in Support of Petitioner, 2005 WL 3087521 at 2-3. It may no longer by practical to research such 
compositions because generic manufacturers will be able to file Abbreviated New Drug Applications 
20
the decision as being based on a misunderstanding of the existing precedent on 
inherency.91  In Newman’s view the precedent on inherency had always dealt in two 
areas: first, situations where a single piece of prior art teaches all the elements of a claim, 
and in these cases the claim lacks novelty.92 The second situation is where a single piece 
of prior art does not include all elements of an invention.93  At that point, the question is 
whether the omitted elements would have been known to PHOSITA.94  If the missing 
elements would have been known to the PHOSITA, as demonstrated by reference to 
extrinsic evidence, then the claim is anticipated.95
Clearly, the first circumstance did not exist since DCL was an in vivo
metabolization not covered by the elements of the loratadine ‘233 patent.  The second 
situation may have applied since loratadine did not claim DCL, but did lead to the 
creation of DCL.  The question at that point, according to Judge Newman, was whether 
PHOSITA would have recognized the presence of DCL.  If so, no further patent 
protection is warranted due to the danger that sophisticated patent applicants would omit 
known claims in order to prolong patent protection.  But, rather than engaging in the 
(ANDAs) that will capitalize off both the research and testing undertaken by brand name manufacturers.  
They will then be able to enter the market with generic forms of the drugs, long before brand name 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have been able to recoup their investment.  Also lost will be any profits that 
can be reinvested in research and development.  Pharmaceutical companies could resort to trade secret to 
protect metabolites, but there is a danger that one company will be left to discover all alternative ways to 
create a metabolite.  Allowing patents will place the information in the public domain and, because to the 
expanded experimental use exception under Hatch-Waxman, will allow multiple companies to research 
alternative methods of creating a metabolite that can be marketed soon after the patent expires.  Under 
Integra Lifesciences v. Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. 193 (2005), companies may make fair use of patented 
products if the use is related to government approval, even if that use is ultimately economic in nature.  
This allows for approval of alternative methods of creating a metabolite during the patent term, with 
marketing to follow as soon as the term expires.  Multiple methods of creating a metabolite are useful to 
address the different needs possessed by individuals in society.     




95 Id. at 995.  
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analysis of Contiental Can, the Federal Circuit adopted a bright line pre cluding all 
additional patents for metabolites regardless of whether PHOSITA recognition was 
present.     
Judge Newman’s second major objection is that Judge Rader’s panel, in 
contradicting what she viewed to be the existing case law concerning inherent 
anticipation, went beyond what a panel could permissibly do.96 Judge Newman agreed 
that there was no infringement, but she reached that conclusion because she did not 
believe that Schering could prevent people from practicing the prior art.97 In her view,
the decision in Schering was not only a misunderstanding of previous case law, but 
ultimately amounted to a full scale rejection of existing precedent.98  Newman stated, 
understandably, that “a rejection of precedent requires en banc action, not panel 
disruption.”99
96 Schering, 348 F.3d. at 995.  Fed. Cir. R. 35(a)(2).  
97 Id. at 993-994.
98 Id. at 995.
99 Id. at 995.  Fed. Cir. R. 35(a)(2).  It is uncertain exactly why the Federal Circuit chose to address the 
matter of inherent anticipation with a panel decision.  That the Schering case appears to have been “de 
facto” adopted by the circuit, after a panel hearing, seems to speak to the influence of Judge Rader.  The 
Federal Circuit in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d. 1328, once again seemed to 
endorse Judge Rader’s view of inherent anticipation.  Initially Judge Rader ruled that clinical trials 
constituted public use that would invalidate the “Paxil” patent, but stated that an alternative grounds for 
invalidating the patent was inherent anticipation due to SmithKline’s claim that the ‘723 matierial was 
created upon ingestion of the prior art ‘196 patent.  See SmithKline v. Apotex, 365 F.3d. 1306 (Fed. Cir. 
2004), vacated by SmithKline v. Apotex, 403 F.3d. 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  The Federal Circuit’s vacating of 
the previous “Paxil” decision en banc can be seen as an endorsement of Judge Rader’s view of inherent 
anticipation since he specifically stated in his previous decision which alternative grounds he would use to 
pass upon the case of given the opportunity, see SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1320. This allowed Judge Rader 
to invalidate the “Paxil” patent based on his view of inherent anticipation and, since the ‘723 substance was 
created by ingesting the prior art ‘196 substance, it was inherently anticipated regardless of whether it was 
recognized.  SmithKline v. Apotex, 403 F.3d. 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  Both the vacating of the previous 
“Paxil” decision and the new “Paxil” decision were released on April 8, 2005.  However, the cases 
preceding Scherng indicate that the matter of inherent anticipation in relation to biological and 
pharmaceutical compositions may have actually been festering for a while.  A year before Schering, Judge 
Newman reversed a District Court decision in Elan Pharmaceuticals v. Mayo Foundation, 304 F.3d. 1221 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) in which the lower court found a patent for a “recipe” to make transgenic mice was 
anticipated.  Newman found the prior art possessed too many alternatives to allow for reliable production of 
the mice and thus the requirements of anticipation were not met since PHOSITA would not have 
recognized how to make the mice.  Judge Dyk, in a dissent, objected to what he viewed as the patenting of 
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Judge Lourie also dissented from the decision not to rehear the case en banc.100
His concern was that Schering was an “extraordinary decision, effectively precluding 
virtually all patents on human metabolites of drugs.”101 Judge Lourie also pointed out 
some of the practical limitations that currently exist and that affect the ability of 
pharmaceutical companies to originally patent metabolites.102  Namely, patents covering 
pharmaceuticals typically issue prior to the completion of clinical trials, which is when 
the identity and nature of the metabolites are likely to become known.103  He believed 
that the Schering decision would preclude protection of related metabolites by creating a 
rule that will find existing patents to be effective prior art against their metabolites per 
se.104 In Judge Lourie’s view, the mere disclosure of a certain chemical composition that 
should be administered to a patient is not sufficient to enable a metabolite merely because 
such administration would “inevitably cause the human body to make the metabolite.”105
Judge Lourie would not allow every metabolite to be patented.  He stated that he would 
“existing inventions” in light of recent cases (In Re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation) that prohibited such 
patents.  The Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, which later merely vacated the previous panel decision, 
Elan, 314 F.3d. 1299.  Judge Newman’s later opinion, rather than concentrating on non recognition of the 
missing elements by PHOSITA, instead stated that the prior art was not sufficiently enabled to allow one to 
replicate without undue experimentation, Elan, 346 F.3d. 1051.  Nonetheless, even without the Judge 
Newman’s original Elan decision, which directly contradicted Judge Rader’s view on the need for 
recognition by PHOSITA to trigger inherent anticipation, there still exists a troubling split within the 
Circuit concerning inherent anticipation.  The Continental Can line of cases are still good law, as are the 
cases relied on by Schering and SmithKline (Atlas Powder, Mehl/Biophile, EMI Group).  The two 
conflicting lines of cases necessitate resolution by the Court en banc, even though it appears clear that 
Judge Rader’s view on inherent anticipation is generally accepted within the Court.
100 Schering, 348 F.3d. at 995.  
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.  Judge Lourie seems to take a strikingly different view on the patenting of metabolites from the view 
expressed by Judge Rader.  Whereas Judge Rader seems to be primarily concerned with the direct and 
immediate public policy concerns surrounding metabolites, namely that pharmaceutical companies will 
manage to extend their patent, Judge Lourie appears to be more concerned with how fair the adopted 
process would be to those seeking patents.  Like Judge Newman, he appears to believe that metabolites do 
meet the requirements of patent and seems to feel that a categorical refusal to patent metabolites does 
nothing to advance the public interests and will hinder scientific advancement.   
104 Schering, 348 F.3d. at 996.  
105 Id.  
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rule differently if the patent actually taught how to make metabolites or if the patented 
material was in “actual public use” prior to the filing of the new patent application.  In 
those cases the metabolite would be unpatentable.106 According to Judge Lourie, the 
Federal Circuit should be interested solely in patent law, not policy or equity.107  To hold 
that a “patent on a product, with minimal disclosure of administering to a human or other 
subject, anticipates a later application on a metabolite, of which no mention appears 
whatsoever in the patent, cannot be correct.”108
Judge Rader’s decisions in Schering, and later in SmithKline, can be justified 
through his concern for the public policy implications that would have arisen had the 
Circuit allowed for the patenting of metabolites caused by prior art.  Despite 
acknowledging that, unlike Atlas Powder, MEHL, and EMI Group, the Court was finding 
subject matter to be anticipated without any express description present, Judge Rader 
found no reason to conclude that a distinct substance arising from prior art should be 
treated any differently than an inherent characteristic of prior art.109  In Judge Rader’s 
view the dispositive issue is whether an anticipatory reference enabled the use of the 
106 Id.  Judge Lourie appears willing to apply an on-sale bar to products that produce an unknown 
metabolite, but does not believe that the standard one year time period from the initial issuing of the patent 
should be applied in determining whether or not a substance is barred from receiving a further patent.  In 
his view pharmaceutical companies should be allowed to patent any substances discovered during clinical 
trials or other experimental stages that occur prior to the drugs being marketed to the public.  This view is 
more consistent with the view of Continental Can that a reference does not qualify as prior art unless it is 
recognized.  Judge Newman offered a sensible recommendation that would seem to address the concerns of 
both Judge Rader and Judge Lourie.  In her view, Schering erred not by patenting a newly discovered 
metabolite (DCL) but by attempting to prevent others from practicing prior art in the public domain that 
could result in the production of the patented metabolite.  Schering v. Geneva, 348 F.3d. at 994, dissent to 
denial of rehearing en banc. Judge Newman’s alternative solution would be to allow for the patenting of a 
DCL in a limited manner.  All competitors would be able to practice the prior art, whether or not it created 
the patented DCL, but Schering would be able to bar competitors from creating new alternatives ways of 
creating DCL.  In this manner the DCL patent would be valid and capable of being exploited, but nothing 
would be removed from the public domain.   
107 Id. 
108 Id.  
109 Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1378-1379.  
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claims at issue, regardless of whether PHOSITA recognized that presence of the 
claims.110  Hence allowing the patenting of metabolites that had already been in use 
unknowingly by the public would amount to the removal of the substance from the public 
domain, something clearly impermissible under patent law.111 He went on in Schering to 
state that the “extent of the inherent disclosure does not limit its anticipatory affect,” and, 
coupled with his abandonment of the requirement for recognition by PHOSITA, creates a 
situation where a substance that is non-obvious to PHOSITA, possesses utility, and is not 
anticipated in the standard manner is, nonetheless, inherently anticipated and ineligible 
for patent protection.112  In denying a patent to materials that otherwise qualify under 35 
U.S.C. §§101-103, Judge Rader has made a policy determination regarding the 
desirability of allowing patents that, while advancing the sciences, can reasonably be seen 
as extending patent protection beyond twenty years.
Judge Newman, on the other hand, appears to be solely concerned with patent law 
and does not address the public policy concern raised by Judge Rader.  In her dissent to 
the denial of rehearing en banc for Schering Judge Newman’s objections revolved around 
the Circuit appearing to deny protection to patentable material.  She focused on DCL’s 
novelty and absence in the prior art.113  She then explained that the Schering inventor had 
discovered DCL “in vivo as a degradation product of loratidine, isolated it, determined its 
structure, and found its biologic properties.  This panel nonetheless holds that this new 
compound is unpatentable on the ground of ‘inherent anticipation.’”114 Judge Newman 
then succinctly summarized her concern that no precedent supports the finding that a 
110 Id. at 1381.  
111 Id. at 1379-1380.  
112 Id. at 1378-1379.  
113 Schering, 348 F.3d. at 993.  
114 Id.  
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substance is “inherently anticipated” because it previously existed undiscovered.115
Judge Newman also objected to Schering’s abandonment of the Continental Can
requirement that there be recognition by PHOSITA to trigger inherent anticipation.116
She objects to the inflexible rule of inherent anticipation in Schering because it prohibits 
the patenting of materials that, in her view, meet all the patentability requirements of 35 
U.S.C. §§101-103.
The Federal Circuit chose to draw a hard line in Schering regarding the patenting 
of metabolites.  However, the issue of whether a party may patent byproducts had been 
addressed by the court before, and, as would be guessed based on the severe differences 
of opinion that emerged, the case law was mixed.  There were those, such as Judge 
Newman, who thought that PHOSITA needed to recognize the missing elements in order 
to find anticipation by inherency.  Others, such as Judge Rader, realized that the inherent 
anticipation regimen was open to potential abuse by sophisticated patent holders who 
sought to stagger patent applications for the byproducts of a single invention in order to 
extend patent protection as long as possible.  Both positions had substantial support for 
their views within case law.117
115 Id.  
116 Id. at 995.  According to Schering’s counsel Schering had to develop “new, more sensitive testing 
methods to detect DCL and other metabolites arising out of the ‘233 patent compounds.”  Combined 
Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc by Plaintiff-Appellant, 2003 WL 24033460 at 5-6.  If 
this is true, then denying Schering additional patents for the ‘233 compounds allows others to capitalize off 
Schering’s research and development, and makes it unlikely that Schering can recoup their costs. 
117 Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, “Inherency,” 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 371(2005).  Burk and Lemley 
suggest an interesting theory to reconcile the conflicting views of the Federal Circuit.  Their view is that the 
Court will not grant further protection if the public has already been enjoying the benefit of the unpatented 
claims.  However, in formulating their theory Burk and Lemley attempt to reconcile decisions that predated 
Judge Rader’s attempts to abandon Continental Can’s PHOSITA requirement, beginning with Atlas 
Powder, MEHL/Biophile, EMI Group, and, of course, culminating with the full scale explicit abandonment 
of the PHOSITA requirement in both Schering and SmithKline.  By attempting to reconcile all the Federal 
Circuit’s case law on inherent anticipation, Professors Burk and Lemley do not adequately appreciate the 
seismic shift orchestrated by Judge Rader relating to inherent anticipation.  To begin with, Burke and 
Lemley incorrectly claim that the PHOSITA requirement is irrelevant because no cases pass upon the issue, 
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Schering’s position has yet to be confirmed by the Federal Circuit en banc, but it 
has received additional support from later panel decisions, including SmithKline Beecham 
which is contained in the second prong of the Continental Can test.  The reason for this is that the first 
prong of the Continental Can case, which requires that the trait be shown to be inherently present, is a 
threshold issue and a court must reach it in order to determine whether the issue of a case is inherent 
anticipation or accidental anticipation.  Since inherent anticipation is a somewhat convoluted concept, it is 
not surprising that district courts, who rarely deal with such an issue, would not appreciate the high initial 
standard of proof that must be reached.  It must initially be shown that a trait is present “not by mere 
possibility or probability,” In Re Oelrich, 666 at 581, to even reach the second prong of the Continental 
Can test.  The Seaborg case can be explained on this point because any presence of Americium in the 
Fermi reactor was only theoretical and, while PHOSITA may have suspected its presence, no one could 
sufficiently isolate are recognize Americium with any certainty until Seaborg.  See, e.g. Finnegan Corp. v. 
ITC, 180 F.3d. 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999)(holding that PHOSITA would not recognize the non-resonance 
ejector of the prior art and is therefore not anticipated); In Re Shetty, 566 F.2d. at 84-85 (finding that 
PHOSITA would not have recognized that a previous method to treat microbial infection in animals also 
curbed appetite, and therefore the patent is not anticipated);  see also, FN 71, supra.  Next, there is a need 
to draw a clear distinction between unpatentable inherent traits and inherent byproducts which still may 
“advance the frontiers of science in a narrow field,” General Electric, 326 U.S. at 248-249.  Cases such as 
General Electric, Titanium Metals, and EMI Group merely claimed ever present traits within devices 
whose discovery, while interesting, did not contribute independent utility.  On this ground, the situations in 
Schering and SmithKline can be clearly distinguished in that the compositions claimed have utility 
independent of the original claim, and appear to have been non-obvious even to those in the art.  Judge 
Rader seemed gravely concerned that allowing additional patents on the metabolites of existing substances 
would serve no purpose other than to lengthen patent protection for pharmaceutical companies.  It is the 
second portion of the Continental Can test that is meant to address Judge Rader’s concerns because it 
protects the public by preventing the patenting of things known to “technologists in the field … albeit not 
to judges,” Continental Can, 948 F.2d. at 1269.  This objective test allows a court to ask what was known, 
or should have been known, by PHOSITA in relation to a patent application.  An interesting facet of the 
PHOSITA requirement is that, unlike the test of obviousness, it is not frozen at the date of patenting. So, 
something may not be known to PHOSITA originally and would therefore be eligible for patenting, but 
once it became known by PHOSITA it would no longer be patentable.  This test thereby protects both the 
first discover and the public by allowing initial patentability but prohibiting it once it became known within 
the field because, presumably, there had been sufficient time to apply for a patent and to delay until 
PHOSITA generally recognizes a trait is unjustifiable.  Lastly, the rule of Schering and SmithKline does not 
seem to limit the inherent anticipation bar on patent to material which the public is “already receiving the 
benefit.”  In the Schering case there is no indication that the metabolite DCL was the active ingredient in 
loratadine, rather DCL was an alternative form of a non-drowsy antihistamine.  It is true that Schering 
attempted to prevent competitors from practicing not only DCL but also loratadine after loratadine’s 
original patent expired, but the Schering situation could have been addressed through patent misuse instead 
of creating a blanket rule prohibiting patents.  The SmithKline case creates a more clear example of the 
public not receiving a benefit from the patented material.  In that case, SmithKline created a hemihydrate 
form of an original drug that was more easily manufactured because of its more stable form.  SmithKline 
then attempted to prevent all use of the prior art by claiming the hemihydrate form would appear upon 
ingestion, although the hemihydrate also did not appear to affect the utility beyond its manufacturing 
advantages.  These cases indicate the Court does not view the public’s receipt of the benefit of a material to 
be dispositive when determining inherent anticipation.  The theory suggested by Professors Burk and 
Lemley has some initial appeal but it fails to recognize the Court’s recent shift in its approach to inherent 
anticipation, and it seems to be largely a post hoc rationalization of the Court’s opinions that is unworkable 
in practice.  
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Corporation v. Apotex Corporation (the “PAXIL case”).118 In that case the Federal 
Circuit vacated a previous panel decision that invalidated a patent based on the finding 
that clinical trials constituted public use and remanded the case back to the Judge Rader’s 
panel for further proceedings.119  The basis of Judge Rader’s second opinion in the 
“Paxil” case did not likely surprise the Circuit since his first opinion in SmithKline found 
inherent anticipation would be alternative ground for invalidating the “Paxil” patent.120
Thus, when the Circuit vacated Judge Rader’s first opinion, it could be said to have 
endorsed both his view of inherent anticipation and his determination to use his revised
version of the doctrine to pass upon the “Paxil” patent.  
Had Schering been decided en banc, the questions surrounding the legitimacy of 
an appellate panel ignoring circuit precedent could have been avoided.  But it is likely the 
issue of whether unrecognized metabolites should be precluded from receiving separate 
patents would have been a persistent issue because, as explained in greater detail infra,
the Court’s view of public policy appears, in some respects, to contravene the general 
policy created by Congress through the Hatch-Waxman Act.   
B.  Cases Supporting Judge Newman’s View of Inherent Anticipation
Judge Newman’s view that inherent anticipation requires recognition from 
PHOSITA is consistent with the policy that was slowly developed by the courts regarding 
anticipation by inherency.  The Supreme Court first addressed some form of inherent
anticipation in 1890 with the Tilghman v. Proctor case.121 Later cases, such as Edison 
118 SmithKline Beecham Corporation v. Apotex Corporation, 403 F.3d. 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
119 SmithKline, 365 F.3d. 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated en banc by SmithKline, 403 F.3d. 1328 (Fed. Cir. 
2005).   
120 Id. at 1320.  
121 Tilghman, 102 U.S. 707.  See FN 11, supra.  Inherent anticipation would become an offshoot of 
accidental anticipation.  The Court in Tilghman recognized that Tilghman was entitled to a patent and 
developed a doctrine of non recognized anticipation that would allow them to issue Tilghman a patent.  
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Electric Light Co. v. Novelty Incandescent Light Co.122 and Eibel Process Co. v. 
Minnesota and Ontario Paper123 reiterated the view that a creation whose value was not 
recognized nor appreciated did not constitute prior art.124  These cases are now 
categorized as incidences of “accidental anticipation,” but it is notable that originally a 
threshold question when considering anticipation was whether PHOSITA recognized the 
value of the invention.125
The case of In Re Seaborg supports Judge Newman’s position.126  In Seaborg the 
material being patented was Americium, also known as element 95, as well as the 
accompanying isotopes and methods of producing and purifying the element.127
Difficulty in the patenting process arose because Americium had almost certainly been 
produced in the prior art Fermi reactor.128  However, the presence of Americium was 
impossible to prove because the maximum amount that could have been produced had the 
reactor ran for 100 days at 500 kilowatts was no more than one-billionth of a gram, which 
would be interspersed with 40 tons of highly radioactive reactor fuel.129  Even if it had 
been possible to safely measure the amount of Americium present, the technology of the 
time would not have allowed for certain confirmation of its presence.130  The Seaborg 
court ultimately concluded that the prior art would not allow for the creation of 
Courts later recognized that their focus on non-recognition was capable of being expanded to situations 
where the unrecognized trait is always present.  Allowing the Tilghman rule to be applied to these cases 
would extend patent protection and potentially encourage willful blindness.  As a result inherent 
anticipation was developed to deny patents in those situations.    
122 Edison Electric Light Co., 167 F. 977.  See FN 11, supra.  
123 Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923).
124 Id. at 66.  
125 See FN 38, supra, for a list of factors to differentiate “accidental anticipation” from “inherent 
anticipation.”   
126 In Re Seaborg, 328 F.2d. 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964).  
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 997.
130 Id.
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Americium “without the exercise of more than ordinary skill in the art.”131 Based on the 
conclusion that PHOSITA would not have been able to create Americium from the prior 
art a patent was granted over the examiner’s original denial.132
The precedent seemed well established by the time the C.C.P.A. considered the 
case of In re Shetty.133 The Shetty case pertained to a method of “curbing appetite in 
animals by administering certain adamantane compounds.”134  The Patent and Trademark 
Board of Appeals originally denied all claims as “analogous” to the prior art and 
therefore obvious or anticipated.135  The Court affirmed the Appeals Board’s decision as 
to one claim, but reversed the Board on the other five claims.136  In the case of the five 
claims that were allowed to issue, the C.C.P.A. stated that they were not convinced that 
131 Seaborg, 328 F.2d. at 999.  
132 Id.  An interesting question arises- what if Americium could have been proved, during the life of the 
Seaborg patent, to be produced by the Fermi patented reactor?  At that point is it possible to invalidate the 
patent as inherently anticipated?  If not, does anyone using the Fermi reactor become an infringer?  The 
natural answer would be that, if the patent is valid, a patent holder should not be permitted to prevent others 
from using prior art that has passed into the public domain.  This was the view that Judge Newman 
suggested in Schering, but appears to have been rejected by Judge Rader.  A second view would be to allow 
for de minimus use of the patented product.  This second view was suggested by Judge Posner, sitting by 
designation, in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F.Supp. 2d. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2003), in a case 
involving the “seeding” of a patented product in prior art.  “Seeding” could have occurred in this case if 
anyone attempting to experiment with the prior art ‘196 patent used the ‘723 in experimentation.   
SmithKline, 247 F.Supp. 2d. at 1024.  Seeding can occur if the ‘723 material is handled roughly or dropped, 
and molecules break off.  Once a seed of ‘723 material enters the manufacturing facility of the ‘196 
material it begins to convert the ‘196 substance to the ‘723 substance, Id. at 1023. However, the ‘196 
substance would reach a saturation point at a percentage points, but any manufacturing advantage would 
require results in the “high double digits.”  Id., at 1024-1025  There was also testimony at the trial court 
that once a facility was seeded it would almost be impossible to “unseed” it.  Id., 247 F.Supp. 2d. at 1021.  
Judge Rader, in SmithKline Beecham Corp v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d. 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated 
en banc, SmithKline, 403 F.3d 1328, rejected the view that policy may affect claim construction and 
rejected the suggestion of a de minimus exception to infringement.  He did however leave open the 
possibility that a claim, which would make infringers of those using the prior art, may be invalid for 
indefiniteness in violation of 35 U.S.C. §112.  This case presents a somewhat analogous situation to the one 
addressed in this paper, but there is a significant difference…in the Seaborg case the Americium is a 
byproduct that is probably unrelated to the utility of the prior art and its presence was theoretical.  In the 
SmithKline situation, the previously unknown byproduct is related to the utility of the prior art, not to the 
consumer but in the manufacturing process.  Furthermore, SmithKline wanted to prevent all creation of the 
hemihydrate, including creation that occurred by practicing the prior art.      
133 In re Shetty, 566 F.2d. 81 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
134 Id. at 81.  
135 Id. at 84-85.  The prior art had actually been used combat microbial infestation, but such actions can 
arguably inhibit appetite.
136 Id. at 86.
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since Shetty’s method corresponded or inhered to the prior art that it was obvious.137  The 
Court went on to state that “inherency is quite immaterial if, as the record establishes 
here, one of ordinary skill in the art would not appreciate or recognize the inherent 
result.”138  Once again, more than a dozen years after Seaborg the Court’s primary 
concern when considering inherency was whether PHOSITA would have recognized the 
inherent result.  
A similar situation arose in In Re Oelrich four years later.139  Like Shetty, the 
Oelrich case dealt with the patenting of a process that was arguably anticipated by the 
prior art.140  In Oelrich, the patent claims involved a means for generating a “low inertia” 
carrier frequency to steer the fins of guided missiles.141  The prior art involved “high 
inertia” carrier frequencies that Oelrich admitted would occasionally fall within the range 
of his stated frequencies.142  The Court approved the patent and declared that
[inherency] could not be established by probabilities or possibilities.  The mere fact that a 
thing might occur is not sufficient … [but] if the disclosure is sufficient to show that the 
natural result flowing from the operation … of the questioned function, it seems well 
settled that the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.143
In Oelrich, the major issue concerned the inherency of an unknown function that Oelrich
claimed to discover.144  The court, in determining that the claims were not inherent within 
the prior art did not reach the issue of whether PHOSITA would have recognized the 
137 Id. at 86.  
138 Shetty, 566 F.2d. at 86.. 
139 In Re Oerlich, 666 F.2d. 578 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
140 Id. at 580.  
141 Id. at 579-580.  
142 Id.
143 Id. at 581, (citing Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d. 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939)).
144 In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d at 580.  
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claim.145 Based on the parallel analysis of the C.C.P.A. with Shetty, the Court would 
have addressed recognition by PHOSITA if inherency had been found.146
Judge Newman authored the Federal Circuit’s decision for In Re Spada.147  The 
Spada case dealt with “pressure sensitive adhesives and manufactured articles.”148  These 
adhesives were created by using “polymers of the same monomers, in overlapping ratios 
of components” as the prior art, but created a product “quite different” from the prior 
art.149  Based on the prior art Smith reference the examiner determined that a prima facie 
case existed that Spada’s invention was unpatentable as anticipated.150 Newman found 
that the virtual identity of the monomers was disclosed in the prior art, as was the 
procedure necessary to create the monomers, and the reference described the applicant’s 
claimed invention “sufficiently to have placed a person of ordinary skill in the field of the 
invention in possession of it.”151  Since the products were described sufficiently to enable 
PHOSITA to be in possession of them, the claimed invention was anticipated 
notwithstanding the differences in the final products.152
In 1995 the Federal Circuit considered the case of a polymorph version of a 
previously patented composition.153  In Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., Glaxo created and 
received a patent on ranitidine hydrochloride, a “powerful histamine blocker, inhibiting 
145 Id.
146 See, e.g.,  In Re Spada, 911 F.2d. 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  Judge Newman outlines the anticipation 
analysis as 1) all the elements of a claimed invention must be described in a single reference, and 2) the 
reference must be sufficient to place PHOSITA in possession of it.  See also FN 71, supra.   
147 In Re Spada, 911 F.2d. 705.
148 Id. at 706.
149 Id. at 707.  
150 Id. at 707-708 and FN 3.
151 Id. at 708.  
152 In Re Spada, 911 F.2d. at 708. 
153 Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d. 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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the secretion of stomach acid.”154  Two years after the original patent issued in 1978 
(U.S. Patent No. 4,128,658, “the ‘658 patent”) Glaxo used a more efficient new method 
to manufacture the ‘658 material.155  The new process, at one point, created the ‘658 
material into a crystalline version, or polymorph version of the original ranitidine 
hydrochloride.156 This version was better suited for commercial production and a second 
patent was issued covering this new composition (U.S. Patent No. 4,521,431, “the ‘431 
patent”).157 Further tests showed that practicing the new version of manufacture for the
‘658 material did not always produce the ‘431 material.158 In 1991 Novopharm, a Glaxo 
competitor, filed an ANDA seeking to practice the ‘431 patent in December of 1995, 
which was the expiration of the ‘658 patent, but well before the 2002 expiration of the
‘431 patent.159  Novopharm asserted that the ‘431 patent was anticipated by the ‘658 
patent, and Glaxo sued for technical infringement as permitted by 35 U.S.C. 
§271(e)(2).160 In Glaxo, the court held that a claim is only anticipated, either expressly or 




158 Glaxo, 52 F.3d. at 1047.
159 Id.  at 1047.  
160 Id.  In this case it appears that Novopharm had no interest in practicing the ‘658 patent, but hoped that it 
would provide it a basis to invalidate the ‘431 patent.  Glaxo does not appear to have had any objection to 
Novopharm practicing the ‘658 patent, perhaps because it was aware that Novopharm had no interest in 
actually practicing the ‘658 patent.  However, compare Glaxo’s behavior to that of Schering and 
SmithKline in Schering and SmithKline.  In those cases Schering and SmithKline attempted to completely 
prohibit the practice of the prior art, and both found their patents to be invalidated through inherent 
anticipation.  In this case Glaxo did not attempt to prevent practice of the ‘658 patent despite the knowledge 
that at some point it would likely morph into the ‘431 form, and the legal outcome for the ‘431 patent was 
much better than for the patents covering DCL and Paxil.  The Federal Circuit may have been partly 
reacting in those cases to the overreaching of both Schering and SmithKline, or it may have taken time to 
develop a new view on inherency.  It is also possible that the facts dictated a different outcome.  In both 
Schering and SmithKline the claimed compositions were metabolites inherent within the claimed 
composition upon ingestion, whereas that was not the situation in this case.  However, the court does go on 
to require, in dicta, that inherency be recognized by PHOSITA, which was not shown to be the case in 
either Schering or SmithKline.    
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inherently, if all the limitations are contained within a single piece of prior art.161  But, in 
order to be anticipated by inherency, it is necessary that the inherency would “be 
appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art.”162  The district court had concluded that 
the ‘658 patent did not inevitably result in the creation of the polymorph covered by the 
‘431 patent, so anticipation did not exist.  The Federal Circuit found this holding not to be 
clearly erroneous.163
Continental Can marked the last occasion where Judge Rader and Judge Newman
agreed on a case of inherency, although they would later vociferously disagree as to the 
actual scope of the case’s holding.164  In Continental Can, the controversy concerned 
whether a prior art process to produce cans necessarily produced “hollow” ribs, even 
though all sides agreed that the ribs were not shown as hollow in the patent.165  Judge 
Newman stated that where inherency is to be found it is necessary to refer to extrinsic 
evidence, but such evidence must make clear that “the missing descriptive matter is 
necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so 
recognized by persons of ordinary skill.”166  The Court vacated summary judgment on the 
issue of inherency because there was conflicting expert testimony as to whether “hollow” 
ribs were necessarily created.167 Later, in Schering, Judge Rader claimed that 
“Continental Can does not stand for the proposition that an inherent feature of a prior art 
reference must be perceived as such by a person of ordinary skill in the art before the 
161 Id. at 1047.  
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 1047-1048.  
164 Continental Can Company USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Company, 948 F.2d. 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  For more 
on Newman’s and Rader’s subsequent disagreement as to the holding of the Continental Can case see FNs 
18, 19, and 69, supra.   
165 Id. at 1268-1269.
166 Id. at 1268 (emphasis added).
167 Id. at 1269.
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critical date.”168  He instead stated that the holding of the case was that summary 
judgment was inappropriate when there was conflicting expert testimony.169  Technically, 
Judge Rader is correct; the case was remanded for a determination on the first part of the 
articulated test, so Judge Newman’s two part test for inherent anticipation is dicta.170
Ultimately, the Continental Can case was remanded for a determination of whether the 
“hollow” ribs would be inevitably created since inherency cannot be established by 
“possibilities or probabilities.”171 However, Judge Newman’s test, which required 
PHOSITA recognition of the inherent presence of the missing descriptive matter to 
trigger inherent anticipation, is well supported by the prior case law, discussed supra.172
Subsequent to Continental Can, the Federal Circuit required recognition by 
PHOSITA in order to find anticipation by inherency in Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite 
Company.173  The Rosco case concerned convex school bus “cross-view” mirrors.174
Rosco owned the ‘357 design patent (U.S. Design Patent No. 346,357, “the ‘357 design 
patent”) which covered an “oval, highly convex cross-view mirror with a black, flat metal 
backing.”175  Mirror Lite’s ‘984 utility patent (U.S. Patent No. 5,589,984, “the ‘984 
patent”) covered an “oval cross-view mirror with a varying radius of curvature along the 
major axis of the convex ellipsoid mirrorlens.”176  Rosco’s ‘357 design patent was filed in 
168 Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1377.
169 Id.
170 Continental Can, 948 F.2d. at 1268.
171 Id.  
172 Id. See, Rosco Corp. v.Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d. 1373, 1380-1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Finnegan 
Corporation v. ITC, 180 F.3d. 1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In Re Robertson, 169 F.3d. 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 
1999); In Re Paulsen, 30 F.3d. 1475, 1480-1481 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In Re Spada, 911 F.2d. 705, 708 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990); In Re Oelrich, 666 F.2d. 578, 581-582 (Fed. Cir. 1981); In Re Shetty, 566 F.2d. 81, 84-85 
(C.C.P.A. 1977); In Re Seaborg, 328 F.2d. 996, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1964); Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 26 CCPA 937 
(C.C.P.A. 1939); see also, FN 71, supra.
173 Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Company, 304 F.3d. 1373 (2002).  
174 Id. at 1376.
175 Id.  
176 Id.  
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April of 1992 and issued in April of 1994 and predated Mirror Lite’s patent that had a 
priority date of September of 1992.177  Both companies sued one another based on 
infringement of each other’s respective patents.178  Rosco also alleged that Mirror Lite’s 
‘984 patent was inherently anticipated by its own ‘357 design patent because anyone 
practicing their design patent would create a mirror with a varying radius of curvature.179
The district court granted summary judgment to Rosco on its claim of inherent 
anticipation, but the Federal Circuit reversed.180 The Court stated that in order for 
inherent anticipation to apply, it must be shown that the missing element is “necessarily 
present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by a 
person of ordinary skill.”181 The relevant question was not whether the use of a “vacuum 
thermoforming process” inherently resulted in a “varying radius of curvature along the 
major axis,” but rather whether “one skilled in the [would] art read the ‘357 design patent 
as showing the varying radius of curvature.”182 The record did not show that PHOSITA 
would have recognized the ‘357 design patent as inherently disclosing the ‘984 patent, so 
summary judgment was inappropriate.183
Crown Operations v. Solutia Inc, decided just a year before Schering, confirms 
that inherent anticipation requires recognition by PHOSITA.184 Crown Operations
involved layered films in glass that improve the safety and performance of the glass, most 
177 Id.  
178 Rosco, 304 F.3d. at 1376.
179 Id. at 1380.  
180 Id.
181 Id. (emphasis added).
182 Id. at 1380-1381.
183 Rosco, 304 F.3d. at 1381.
184 Crown Operations International. Ltd. v. Solutia Inc., 289 F.3d. 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  Crown sued 
Solutia seeking declaratory relief that Solutia’s patent was invalid because it both lacked novelty and was 
obvious.   
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notably windshields.185  The patented films resist shattering while also limiting visual 
distortion by ensuring that visible light reflection was limited to two percent or less, 
whereas prior solar films permitted reflection of three percent or greater.186  The District 
Court found Solutia’s pate nt (U.S. Patent No. 4,973,511, “the ‘511 patent”) to be valid on 
summary judgment against an invalidity argument of inherent anticipation.187  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed: “if the two percent reflectance limitation is inherently disclosed 
by the [prior art] patent, it must be necessarily present and a person of ordinary skill in 
the art would [be presumed to] recognize its presence.”188 Also, the inherent presence 
must be established, as a preliminary matter, as something that is more than a “possibility 
or probability.”189  In this case the Court found that Crown had failed to carry its 
evidentiary burden of showing the two percent limitation to be necessarily present in the 
‘661 patent.190
Finally, the case of Elan Pharmaceuticals v. Mayo Foundation may have been the 
initial moment that the two schools of thought regarding inherent anticipation, as 
represented by Judges Newman and Rader, came into open conflict.191  Judge Newman 
authored the opinions in this case, which dealt with a “recipe” to make transgenic 
mice.192  The District Court invalidated Elan’s ‘486 and ‘003 patents (U.S. Patent No. 
5,612,486, “the ‘486 patent” and U.S. Patent No. 5,850,003, “the ‘003 patent”) as being 
185 Id. at 1370.
186 Id. at 1370-1371.
187 Id. at 1371.  
188 Id. at 1377 (emphasis added).  
189 Crown Operations, 289 F.3d. at 1377.
190 Id.  
191 Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research, 304 F.3d. 1221 
(Fed. Cir. 2002); vacated en banc and remanded to panel, 314 F.3d. 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002); aff’d on other 
grounds, 346 F.3d. 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
192 Id. at 1223.  
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anticipated by the Mullan ‘169 patent (U.S. Patent No. 5,455,169, “the ‘169 patent).193
The Federal Circuit originally reversed this decision because the legal requirements of 
anticipation had not been met.194  The ‘169 patent was granted to Mullan after he located 
a Swedish family susceptible to Alzheimer’s disease, isolated the mutated gene and its 
protein and expressed the mutation.195  Mullan, however, never produced a transgenic 
animal.196  The Elan ‘486 and ‘003 patents encompass the method of production, which 
experts agreed was unpredictable, and the characteristics of transgenic mice.197 Judge 
Newman once again states that a finding of inherent anticipation requires that the 
limitation be inherently present and that the missing elements in a reference be 
recognized by PHOSITA as being present.198  Judge Newman’s opinion pointed out that 
the Mullan patent did nothing but point out broad recitations of known procedures to 
make transgenic mice, and, to support the finding of no inherency, pointed out that the 
mouse produced by Mayo using the Mullan patent technology was the 2,576th mouse 
screened.199  Based on the shortcomings of the Mullan patent, Judge Newman determined 
that Mayo had failed to support its contention that the Elan patents were anticipated 
inherently.200
Judge Dyk dissented expressing concern that the Court was allowing for the 
patenting of “existing inventions.” He said “[while] Elan may have recognized something 
quite interesting… it has simply not invented anything new.”201 Furthermore, Judge Dyk 
193 Id.  
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 1224.  
196 Elan, 304 F.3d at 1226.  
197 Id.
198 Id. at 1227-1228 (emphasis added).  
199 Id. at 1228.  
200 Id. at 1229.  
201 Elan at 1229-1231. 
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believed that the decision contradicted case law “recently recognized in In Re 
Cruciferous Sprout Litigation … On the issue of inherency ‘it matters not that those of 
ordinary skill heretofore have not recognized these inherent characteristics.’”202  Either 
Judge Dyk was extremely persuasive, or he recognized that the Federal Circuit’s position 
regarding inherency appeared to be shifting, because the court granted a rehearing en 
banc, which subsequently vacated Judge Newman’s first Elan decision.203 In her second
panel decision Judge Newman carefully avoided the issue of inherent anticipation.204
Instead, she chose to base her decision on a lack of enablement.205  She stated that prior 
art must be enabling to inherently anticipate, although, in Newman’s opinion, enablement
by itself is not sufficient to find inherent anticipation.206 The Mullan patent, while citing 
numerous possible methods to produce a mouse, did not suggest which method might 
reasonably be expected to successfully produce a transgenic mouse.207  The case was 
remanded for a determination of whether the Mullan patent enabled PHOSITA to create a 
202 Id. at 1231.
203 Elan Pharmaceuticals v. Mayo Foundation, 314 F.3d. 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
204 Elan Pharmaceuticals v. Mayo Foundation, 346 F.3d. 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  It is also interesting to 
note that this decision was issued several months after the Schering decision.  Completely contradictory 
sets of precedent would have emerged within the Federal Circuit had Judge Newman reissued a decision 
that upheld the patent for failure to prove anticipation by inherency.  Undoubtedly, an en banc hearing 
would have really been held this time to resolve the matter.  The fact that such divisions could occur within 
a Circuit that was created by Congress, to ensure the uniformity of patent opinions would have been 
troubling.  Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, §402 Pub. L. 97-164.  Also, Schering’s counsel later 
implores the court to grant a hearing en banc because, he says, the panel should not have ruled on issues 
similar to those of Elan while the en banc determination was still pending.  Schering v. Geneva, Combined 
Petition for Panel rehearing and Rehearing en banc by Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, 2003 WL 24033460 (2003).  
This is confusing since the court’s decision en banc is dated December 18, 2002, eight months prior to 
Schering counsel’s request for rehearing, and there is no indication that the en banc decision was amended 
at any point.  
205 Id. at 1055-1056.  
206 Id. at 1052.  
207 Id. at 1056.  
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transgenic mouse without undue experimentation, while avoiding the issue of whether the 
Mullan patent was inherently anticipated.208
Judge Newman’s position in her Schering dissent that inherent anticipation 
requires recognition by PHOSITA seems to be well supported by precedent, but it would 
also appear that she did not recognize the shift that was occurring within the Federal 
Circuit regarding matters of inherent anticipation.209  However, her position seems quite 
sensible from a case law standpoint.  Judge Newman’s focus is on whether the subject 
matter could have been patented sooner.  If it could have been, then an additional patent, 
without a terminal disclaimer, should not be permitted; but if PHOSITA could not, and 
did not, recognize the subject matter then science has been advanced and a patent is 
appropriate.  This position seems to be driven primarily out of a concern for patent law, 
in contrast to Judge Rader’s position, which appears to be dictated primarily by public 
policy concerns.
C.  Cases Supporting Judge Rader’s View of Inherent Anticipation
Judge Rader’s position also enjoys substantial support.  However the cases that 
most support his contention that PHOSITA need not recognize an inherent property to 
disqualify that invention from patenting are fairly recent.
An oldest case that can arguably stand for the proposition that recognition by 
PHOSITA is unnecessary to support a finding of inherent anticipation is Titanium Metals 
Corp. of America v. Banner.210 This case involved a patent for titanium alloy in which 
the applicants claimed that their invention was the recognition of the preferable qualities 
208 Id. at 1057.  It was still possible that, had the District Court found the Mullan patent enabling, the matter 
of inherent anticipation could have been brought to the forefront once again.  
209 Schering, 438 F.3d at 992.  Judge Newman viewed such a substantial shift in precedent as only 
appropriate after a hearing en banc.  Fed. Cir. R. 35(a)(2). 
210 Titanium Metals Corporation of America v. Banner, 778 F.2d. 775 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
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of corrosion resistance, strength, and “ductility” which improves the welding properties 
of the alloy.211  Both the examiner and the board rejected the patent application as being 
obvious to PHOSITA in light of a Russian article that predated the patent application by 
five years.212  The applicants then commenced a civil action and the District Court for the 
District of Colombia ordered the patent to issue.213  The Federal Circuit reversed the 
lower court and stated that “Congress has not seen fit to permit the patenting of an old 
alloy…by one who has discovered its corrosion resistance or other useful properties.”214
The Court seems to acknowledge, arguendo, that the applicants were the first to 
specifically discover these inherent properties in the alloys.215  However, it stated that 
“claims cannot be obtained to that which is not new” and the Russian article was found to 
be sufficient to disclose the alloys, regardless of whether all accompanying properties 
were also disclosed.216  By acknowledging that the applicants did discover the properties 
inherent within the alloys, but are nonetheless prohibited from receiving a patent, the 
Court seems to downplay the importance of recognition by PHOSITA in the inherent 
anticipation analysis.217 It should be noted that this case revolved around recognition of a 
trait of the prior art without creating anything new.  Had a patent been granted then the 
titanium alloys in question would have been completely removed from the public domain
without contributing anything that is, in itself, distinctly patentable.  The facts of this case 
are analogous to those of General Electric v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co. where the 
211 Id. at 776-777.  
212 Id. at 781.  
213 Id. at 776.
214 Id. at 782.  
215 Titanium Metals, 778 F.2d. at 782. 
216 Id.  
217 Both the examiner and the Board relied on a finding that PHOSITA would have known of the properties 
based on the Russian publication to justify their denial of a patent originally.  
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court specifically found that discovery of a pre-existing trait within a prior art reference 
does not impart patentability.218
Soon after Titanium Metals the Court ruled, in Verdegaal Brothers v. Union Oil 
Company of California, that recognition by PHOSITA was not necessary to reach a 
finding of inherency.219 Verdegall Brothers involved the infringement of a process for 
making liquid fertilizer by first mixing the elements in a “nutritive heat sink” to absorb 
heat- known as a “heel.”220 A “heel” is nothing more than a previously mixed batch of
liquid fertilizer.221  Verdegall Brothers owned a patent on the process of making liquid 
fertilizer by adding sulfuric acid rapidly to the heel (U.S. Patent No. 4,310,343, “the ‘343 
patent”).222  The prior art Stoller patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,315,763, “the ‘763 patent”)
also called for the creation of a heel.223  Verdegaal Brothers attempted to distinguish their 
patent as novel by claiming that the Stoller patent did not “recognize the ‘inventive 
concept’ that the heel functioned as a heat sink.”224  The Court rejected this argument and 
stated that Union Oil’s burden “was limited to establishing that Stoller disclosed the same 
process.  It did not have the additional burden of proving that Stoller recognized the heat 
sink capabilities of using a heel.”225  The Court went further and declared “even assuming 
Stoller did not recognize that the heel of his process functioned as a heat sink, that 
property was inherently possessed by the heel in his disclosed process, and, thus, his 
process anticipates the claimed invention.”226  Once again, the Court seems to shy away 
218 General Electric, 326 U.S. 242.  See FN 12, supra.  
219 Verdegaal Brothers, Inc. v. Union Oil Company of California, 814 F.2d. 628 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
220 Id. at 630.  
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 632.  
223 Id. 
224 Verdegaal Brothers, 814 F.2d. at 633.
225 Id.  
226 Id.  
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from the importance of recognition by PHOSITA and stated a willingness to invalidate 
the ‘343 patent even if the prior art reference did not recognize that the heel functioned as 
a heat sink.227 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit reversed the jury’s verdict of infringement 
as being unsupported by substantial evidence since the ‘763 patent inherently anticipated 
all the properties of the ‘343 patent.228
Another example of knowledge by PHOSITA not being necessary to prevent 
patenting of a product can be found in Abbott Laboratories v. Geneva
Pharmaceuticals.229  In this case Byron Chemical Company, Inc., an Australian 
company, sold three lots of anhydrous terazosin hydrochloride between 1989-1991.230
Two lots were sold to Geneva Pharmaceuticals and one lot to Warner Chilcott 
Laboratories.231  Abbott Labs subsequently developed the same anhydrous terazosin 
hydrochloride independently and began to market it as “Form IV” of a medication to treat 
hypertension and “benign prostatic hyperplasia.”232  The patent application for Abbott’s 
“Form IV” anhydrous terazosin hydrochloride was filed October 18, 1994 (U.S. Patent 
No. 5,504,207, “the ‘207 patent”).233  Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Novopharm Ltd., and 
Invamed, Inc. filed ANDAs to market generic versions of Form IV and alleged that the 
‘207 patent was invalid as being on sale for more than one year.234 Abbott countered that 
neither Byron Chemical nor the defendants knew that they were dealing with “Form IV”, 
and since they “did not ‘conceive’ the subject matter [of the transaction] … there was no 
227 Id. at 633.
228 Id. at 633-634.  
229 Abbott Laboratories v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 182 F.3d. 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
230 Id. at 1317.
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 1316.  
233 Id. at 1317.
234 Abbott Labs, 182 F.3d. at 1318; 35 U.S.C. §102(b).  
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invention on sale.”235  The Court rejected this argument and said what is important is that 
the three commercial sales before the critical date occurred, and the knowledge of the 
parties is irrelevant.236  “[I]f a product that is offered for sale inherently possesses each of 
the limitations of the claims, then the invention is on sale, whether or not the parties to 
the transactions recognize that the product possesses the claimed characteristics.”237
Abbot Labs is consistent with Judge Rader’s view that recognition by PHOSITA of 
inherent properties is not relevant in determining whether a patent may issue.  Judge 
Rader himself explained this view quite clearly in Atlas Powder Company v. Ireco Inc., 
which was decided a month after Abbott Labs.238
Atlas Powder Case involved two patents for explosive compositions (U.S. Patent 
No. 4,111,727, “the Clay patent;” and U.S. Patent No. RE 33,788, “the reissue 
patent”).239  The district court found the patents to be invalid as anticipated by either the 
‘551 patent (U.S. Patent No. 3,161,551, “the Egly patent”) or by the foreign ‘546 patent 
(U.K. Patent No. 1,306,546, “the Butterworth patent”).240 Neither of the prior art patents 
cited the specific composition of the Clay or of the reissue patent, but the prior art patents 
disclosed the same chemical compositions as the Clay and reissue patents in overlapping 
amounts.241  In affirming the district court, Judge Rader stated that the only limitation not 
arguably within the prior art patents is the requirement that there be “sufficient aeration” 
235 Abbott Labs, 182 F.3d. at 1318.  Between Abbott Labs, Atlas Powder, MEHL/Biophile (decided three 
weeks after Atlas) Judge Rader had begun assembling a recent string of cases that would support his view 
that there was no requirement of recognition by PHOSITA to trigger inherent anticipation.  EMI Group 
would follow two years later, and this string of case law would form the substantive basis for the decisions 
in Schering and SmithKline.
236 Id.  The parties in this case clearly possessed “ordinary skill in the art.”  The court’s rejection of the 
importance of their knowledge underscores that PHOSITA knowledge is an objective inquiry.  
237 Id. at 1319.  
238 Atlas Powder Company v. IRECO Inc., 190 F.3d. 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
239 Id. at 1343.
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 1345.  
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in the composition.242  This limitation was found to be “inevitably and inherently” present 
within the prior art and the claims were unpatentable because the discovery of a 
“previously unappreciated property of a prior art composition … does not render the old 
composition patentably new.”243  Thus, even assuming that the applicants in this case did 
initially discover the property of the prior art composition, that trait is unpatentable 
regardless of the fact that there was no recognition by PHOSITA because the properties 
were inherently present within the prior art.244  It is worth noting, however, that Judge 
Rader, while attempting to make clear that recognition by PHOSITA is not necessary to 
trigger inherent anticipation, explicitly found that “those of ordinary skill in the art at the 
time the patent application was filed knew [of the importance of aeration].”245 Judge 
Rader’s conclusion was that since “sufficient aeration was inherent in the prior art, it is 
irrelevant that the prior art did not recognize the key aspect of [the claimed 
invention].”246  So in the Atlas Powder case Judge Rader made it clear that the claimed 
invention was inherent in the prior art, and there was recognition by PHOSITA of the 
claimed “aeration”; but also believed that there was no need to find recognition by 
PHOSITA of the inherent trait in order to trigger anticipation by inherency.  
Judge Rader’s apparent discomfort with explicitly abandoning the requirement for 
recognition by PHOSITA comes to fore again a month after Atlas Powder in 
MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum.247  In this case the plaintiffs sued the 
defendants for infringing their patent (U.S. Patent No. 5,059,192, “the ‘192 patent”) 
242 Id. 
243 Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d. at 1347.
244 Id. at 1348.
245 Id. at 1347.
246 Id. at 1348.
247 MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d. 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  
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covering a method to remove hair using a laser that destroys “the papilla, thereby 
preventing hair regrowth.”248  The District Court granted summary judgment of invalidity 
based on a manual that anticipated all claims.249  Judge Rader affirmed the invalidity of 
the patent, but based his holding on “the Polla article,” which disclosed all elements of 
the patent, rather than the manual cited by the district court.  He stated that if the 
“disclosure is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the operation as 
taught would result in the performance of the questioned function, it seems well settled 
that the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.”250  Rader goes on to state “where, as 
here, the result is a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, it is of no 
importance that the article’s authors did not appreciate the results.”251 He added that 
“inherency is not necessarily conterminous with knowledge of those of ordinary skill in 
the art.  Artisans of ordinary skill may not recognize the inherent characteristics or 
functioning of prior art.”252 But, once again, Judge Rader covers his bases and states that 
“it is not a question of probabilities as to whether a person of ordinary skill following the 
teachings of the article will align the laser light applicator over a hair follicle,” because
the Polla article dealt with guinea pigs and “[n]o one disputes that guinea pigs have hairy 
backs.”253  So, while attempting, in dicta, to claim that no recognition by PHOSITA is 
necessary Judge Rader ensures, in making his finding of inherent anticipation, that 
everyone understands the claimed results of the invention are inevitable and recognition 
by PHOSITA is present.  
248 Id. at 1364.  
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 1365.
251 Id. at 1366.  
252 MEHL, 192 F.3d. at 1365.  (citing In Re King, 801 F.2d. 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  
253 Id. 
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After Atlas and MEHL/Biophile, Judge Rader’s next opportunity to address the 
issue of inherent anticipation was EMI Group North America v. Cypress 
Semiconductor.254 EMI concerned two patents owned by EMI for metallic fuses for 
semi-conductor chips (U.S. Patent No. 4,826,785, “the ‘785 patent” and U.S. Patent No. 
4,935,801, “the ‘801 patent”).255  The ‘801 patent “claims a structure for a metallic fuse 
with an optically absorptive upper layer, and the ‘785 patent claims a method for 
fabricating and blowing a fuse.”256   Manufacturers “blow” dysfunctional links in a chips 
using a laser beam to sever the connectors, and chips are built with redundant circuits to 
allow for this.257  An expert testified at trial that the claimed method of a theoretical 
vapor-induced explosion was impossible because the metal would expand under the heat 
of the laser and crack the corners of the fuse, destroying the chip.258  The expert believed 
that if he was wrong, and such an explosion was possible without destroying the chip, 
then the explosive mechanism claimed in the fuse would be inherent in all similar prior 
art fuses.259  Judge Rader found that several prior art fuses disclosed the claimed fused 
structure that would make such a severing process possible without destroying the chips, 
although the previous inventors had not recognized the trait.260  It was enough that the 
254 EMI Group North America v. Cypress Semiconductor, 268 F.3d. 1342.  
255 Id. at 1344.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 1346.  
259 EMI, 268 F.3d. at 1347.
260 Id. at 1349-1350 (citing Atlas Powder v. Ireco, 190 F.3d. at 1347, also authored by Judge Rader).  
Perhaps the most interesting portion of Judge Rader’s opinion in EMI is that he makes his first clear 
attempt to partially abandon the PHOSITA recognition requirement of inherent anticipation.  He stated 
[the requirement] that a person having ordinary skill in the art must recognize that the 
missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the reference, may be sensible for 
claims that recite limitations of structure, composition of matter, and method steps which 
could be inherently found in prior art.  Such recognition by one of ordinary skill may be 
important for establishing that the descriptive matter would inherently exist in every 
combination of a claim’s limitation … theoretical mechanisms or rules of natural that are 
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prior art disclosed the structure of the fuse because doing so “inherently discloses the law 
of nature by which the fuses are able to rupture under the heat of a laser.”261
The case of In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation is a great example of exactly the 
type of policy matters that Judge Rader seems most concerned with in his attempt to 
abandon the requirement that PHOSITA recognize an inherent trait for anticipation to be 
triggered.262 This case, which involved neither Judge Rader nor Judge Newman, revolves 
around method patents for growing and eating sprouts to reduce the risk of cancer (U.S. 
Patent No. 5,725,895, “the ‘895 patent”; U.S. Patent No. 5,968,567, “the ‘567 patent”; 
and U.S. Patent No. 5,968,505, “the ‘505 patent”).263  The patent applicants discovered 
that sprouts induce Phase 2 enzymes, which in turn reduce the level of carcinogens.264
The panel agreed with Judge Rader’s position that recognition by PHOSITA was not 
necessary for inherent anticipation to apply.265  They stated that the carcinogen reducing 
characteristics of a sprout are “inherent characteristics” and it does not matter that those 
of ordinary skill have not recognized the traits.266
recited in a claim, that themselves are not patentable, however, do not need to be 
recognized by one of ordinary skill in the art for a finding of inherency.   
Id. at 1350-1351.  So Rader would still require recognition by PHOSITA in cases of patents covering 
structural matter, compositions, and methods; while not requiring recognition by PHOSITA for matter that 
is not patentable to start with.  In the case of metabolites, they are brought about through the body’s natural 
digestive process, but the metabolites themselves are compositions or structural in nature; yet Judge Rader 
is later unwilling to allow for the patenting of newly discovered metabolites brought about due in vivo 
metabolization.      
261 Id. at 1351.  
262 In Re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation, 301 F.3d. 1343 (Fed.Cir. 2002).  
263 Id. at 1345.
264 Id.  
265 Id. at 1350.
266 Id.  The Supreme Court has recently heard arguments in a case very similar to In Re Cruciferous Sprout 
Litigation.  The case is Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, No. 04-
607, oral arguments held March 21, 2006.  In this case a patent was gained for a process that 1) measured 
the body’s fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine and 2) correlated the result with an 
accompanying deficiency of cobalamin or folate, (U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658, “the ‘658 patent”).  
Originally Lab Corp received a license from Metabolite to use a patented test to measure the body’s level 
of homocysteine, however, Lab Corp soon switched to a test developed by Abbott Labs that was cheaper 
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The Court in the Cruciferous Sprout case was grappling with the troubling 
corollary of Judge Newman’s PHOSITA rule: if someone finds an inherent trait that was 
specifically unrecognized but whose end result was known, that individual should 
technically, under the PHOSITA rule, be entitled to a patent.  In this case, people know 
that it is healthy to eat sprouts, but did not know that cruciferous sprouts induced Phase 2 
enzymes that reduced carcinogens and, in turn, cancer.  Yet, despite being technically 
qualified for a patent under the PHOSITA rule, something did not seem right about 
granting a patent in this instance, and doing so could make potential infringers of anyone 
attempting to practice the prior art.  Likewise, in the Schering case, which followed 
Cruciferous Sprout by a year, anyone practicing the prior art loratadine could have been 
infringing on the new DCL patent.267 To address this problem Rader attempted to 
abandon the PHOSITA rule altogether in Schering and instead prohibit patents for 
inherent results regardless of whether there was, or could have been, recognition by 
PHOSITA prior to the patent application.268 This rule serves public policy by ensuring 
that the public is never threatened with infringement from practicing the prior art and 
ensures that material in the public domain remains in the public domain.  But the rule
also bypasses several alternative, less severe methods of ensuring this goal, like Judge 
and more efficient.  Metabolite then sued Lab Corp claiming that whenever someone received a test result 
that showed elevated homocysteine, and then correlated the result to a deficiency in cobalamin or folate, 
the mere correlation in their minds constituted infringement.  The Supreme Court seemed most interested in 
whether such a scientific correlation is patentable under §101.  All sides agreed that the patent holders 
clearly discovered the correlation and, in doing so, overturned what had been for decades the “conventional 
wisdom” relating to elevated levels of homocysteine.  But complicating matters is the fact that Lab Corp 
never explicitly raised §101 until after the Supreme Court asked the Government to address the issue of 
patentability.  After the Supreme Court inquired into §101 it quickly became the linchpin of Lab Corp’s 
case.  Both Metabolite and the Justice Department took the view that the issue of §101 patentability was not 
properly before the court, and it is possible that the Supreme Court could use this ground to dismiss the 
case.       
267 Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1375.
268 Id. at 1377.
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Newman’s suggestion that Schering may not prevent others from practicing the prior 
art.269
Judge Rader’s view rejecting the need for recognition by PHOSITA was well 
received in the subsequent decision of The Toro Company v. Deere & Company.270 In 
the Toro case the Federal Circuit made clear that the new rule, that recognition by 
PHOSITA was no longer required to find anticipation by inherency, was applicable 
across the board and not limited to situations concerning metabolites.271  The Toro case 
involved a method to treat turf by aerating the turf with sporadic injections of liquid 
fertilizer (U.S. Patent No. 5,207,168, “the ‘168 patent”).272  John Deere alleged that 
Toro’s patents were anticipated by the prior art patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,907,516, “the 
‘516 patent”) which also dealt with pulse injections.273 John Deere alleged that practicing 
the ‘516 patent would lead to infringement of the Toro patents because the prior art 
taught all the spacing and pressure parameters that would lead to the aeration Toro 
claimed.274  The District Court denied John Deere’s motion for summary judgment 
because, among other reasons, it found that PHOSITA would not have recognized the 
Toro characteristics at the time the ‘516 patent was filed.275  The Federal Circuit 
corrected the district court on this subject and stated “the fact that a characteristic is a 
necessary feature or result of a prior art embodiment … is enough for inherent 
anticipation, even if that fact was unknown at the time prior to invention.”276  Ultimately, 
the Court upheld the district court’s denial of summary judgment because John Deere did 
269 See Schering, Judge Newman’s dissent to denial of rehearing en banc, 348 F.3d. at 993-994.
270 The Toro Company v. Deere & Company, 355 F.3d. 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
271 Id. at 1320.
272 Id. at 1314, 1317.  
273 Id.
274 Id. at 1318.
275 Toro, 355 F.3d. at 1320.
276 Id. at 1321.
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not supply adequate evidence to support such a judgment, but the matter was remanded 
for a determination of the validity of the ‘168 patent.277
Another Federal Circuit panel also endorsed Schering’s holding in the 
pharmaceutical context and found that recognition by PHOSITA is not necessary to find
invalidity due to inherent anticipation. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.
involves the antidepressant drug PAXIL®.  The case was originally tried before Circuit 
Court Judge Richard Posner, sitting by designation.278  PAXIL® was developed over a 
long period of time.  The initial patent for paroxetine was first obtained in 1977 by a 
British company called Ferrosan (U.S. Patent No. 4,007,196, “the ‘196 patent”).279
Ferrosan then licensed the ‘196 patent to SmithKline.280 The ‘196 patent covered an
“anhydrous” form of the paroxetine.  Because they can become “soggy”, anhydrous
materials are difficult to manufacture because of the special care that must be taken to 
maintain their viability.281  In 1985, however, a SmithKline researcher realized the 
material had naturally morphed into a “pseudo polymorph,” known as a hemihydrate, 
which is much more stable and easily manufactured than the original anhydrous version 
of the drug.282 SmithKline received a second patent for this new version of paroxetine 
(U.S. Patent No. 4,721,723, “the ‘723 patent”).283  This second patent began to be 
marketed as PAXIL® in 1993.284
277 Id. 
278 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,  247 F. Supp. 2d. 1011, 1013 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
279 Id. at 1015. 
280 Id.
281 Id. at 1017.
282 Id. 
283 SmithKline, 247 F.Supp at 1017.  
284 Id.  
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Complications soon arose due to the nature of the anhydrous version of 
paroxetine.285  The original ‘196 patent on peroxetine expired in 1992; however, when 
Apotex announced plans in 1998 to work with the ‘196 patent to make a generic version 
of anhydrous peroxetine, SmithKline sued them.286  SmithKline’s complaint was that any 
version of the ‘196 material was likely to contain some ammount of the ‘723 
hemihydrate, whose patent would not expire until 2006.287  The basis for SmithKline’s 
claims were that, first, the ‘196 patent is likely morph into the protected hemihydrate 
form of peroxtine, which is how SmithKline originally discovered the ‘723 material.288
Second, even if the ‘196 material did not morph into the ‘723 material it is highly likely 
that any Apotex manufacturing location would be “seeded” with PAXIL®.289  The 
“seeding” phenomenon is likely to occur anytime that the ‘723 material is handled 
roughly and small crystals come lose and then implant in the ‘196 material; the ‘723 
material will then multiply within the ‘196 material to a saturation point, within 
pharmaceutical manufacturing plants, of several percent.290 Lastly, SmithKline claims 
that even if Apotex can prevent any of the ‘196 material from morphing into the ‘723 
material, infringement will occur when a patient ingests the ‘196 material because small 
amounts of the ‘723 material will invariably be created within their damp, wet 
stomachs.291
285 Id. at 1020.
286 Id. at 1023.
287 Id. 
288 SmithKline, 247 F.Supp 2d, at 1017.
289 Id. at 1020-1021. 
290 Id. at 1020-1023.  Within areas of high heat and humidity it is possible that the ‘196 material would 
fully convert to the ‘723 hemihydrate.  It is also standard practice to experiment with related compounds in 
an attempt to determine what differences may exist.  In this case Apotex would likely experiment with the 
‘723 material when producing the ‘196 material.  
291 Id. at 1014-1015.  The previous Judge on the case had already excluded evidence of contributory 
infringement brought on by ingestion of the ‘196 patent, Posner agreed that a finding of contributory 
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Judge Posner addressed the concern of natural morphing of the ‘196 material to a 
hemihydrate by limiting protectability of the ‘723 patent to “commercially significant 
amounts.”292 He then limited the ability of SmithKline to allege infringement due to 
“seeding” by creating an equitable defense that the patent holder caused the 
infringement.293 Posner further justified this defense by stating that to hold otherwise 
would allow SmithKline more protection for the ‘723 patent than patent law intended.294
Judge Posner also ruled that Apotex had not shown to his satisfaction that the ‘196 patent 
will inherently contain the ‘723 material, thereby allowing the ‘723 patent to be valid 
over a claim of anticipation by inherency.295  Judge Posner’s ultimate conclusion was that 
the ‘723 patent was valid but not infringed.296
Judge Rader authored the two subsequent opinions in SmithKline.  In the initial
panel decision, Judge Rader rejected nearly all of Judge Posner’s conclusions but 
ultimately found the patent to be invalid for public use.297  Among Rader’s conclusions 
were that it was error to limit the claims in the ‘723 patent to commercially significant 
amounts because claim construction is “not a policy driven inquiry,” and the proper claim 
infringement based on those facts would be inappropriate since Apotex had no desire to produce such a 
result.  Additionally, Judge Posner found that under normal manufacturing conditions the growth of the 
‘723 material would occur quickly but level off at “a few percentage points,” Id. at 1023.  Judge Posner 
also accepted expert testimony that the ‘723 material would have to be present “in the high double digits to 
contribute any commercial value to the production of the ‘196 material” since the two products are 
bioequivalent the only advantage gained is through the more efficient production allowed by the ‘723 
material, Id. at 1024-1025. 
292 Id. at 1029-1030.  The testimony at trial indicated that hemihydrate needed to be present in amounts in 
the “high double digits” in order to be of any commercial significance.  This was highly unlikely in the 
carefully controlled environment of a pharmaceutical plant, and Judge Posner stated that creation at such 
levels would have to be intentional and would serve only to expose a drug manufacturer to clear liability 
for infringement. 
293 SmithKline, 247 F.Supp at 1043.
294 Id. at 1046.
295 Id. at 1035-1036.
296 Id. at 1052.
297 SmithKline, 365 F.3d. 1306, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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construction of the ‘723 patent encompassed all hemihydrate.298 Also, he concluded that 
the previous Judge, from whom Judge Posner took over the case but by whose procedural 
decisions Posner was bound, abused his discretion in failing to hear evidence on 
SmithKline’s claims of contributory infringement through ingestion.299 Additionally, 
while he understood that Posner was concerned about the implications of finding Apotex 
liable for infringement that occurred by practicing something in the public domain,
Posner’s equitable defense was not necessary since the patent could be dispensed with on 
alternative grounds.300 Rader then invalidated the patent for being in public use under 
§102(b) by reasoning that the individuals taking part in the clinical tests were not bound 
by confidentiality.301  Amazingly, Rader passed on the initial opportunity to invalidate the 
‘723 patent for inherent anticipation despite the fact that SmithKline alleged infringement 
through in vivo degradation, and despite his specifically warning SmithKline that success 
on that allegation would result in invalidation of the patent for inherent anticipation.302
The Circuit then vacated the panel decision en banc and remanded the matter 
back to Judge Rader’s panel, knowing his likely decision would be to hold the patent 
invalid as inherently anticipated.303 In writing his second SmithKline decision Rader 
once again corrected the original mistakes made in Judge Posner’s district court decision, 
298 Id. at 1313-1314. Judge Rader specifically rejected Judge Posner’s claim construction limiting the ‘723 
material to “commercially significant amounts,” SmithKline at 1029-1030.  Judge Rader stated that “claim 
construction is not a policy driven inquiry … [and] the scope of patent claims can neither be broadened nor 
narrowed based on abstract policy considerations regarding the effect of a particular claim meaning.”  
SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 365 F.3d. 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004); opinion vacated en banc by 403 
F.3d. 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005); aff’d on other grounds 403 F.3d. 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
299 Id. at 1311.  
300 Id. at 1316.
301 Id. at 1317.
302 SmithKline, 365 F.3d. at 1320.
303 SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 403 F.3d. 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  See SmithKline, 365 F.3d. at 1320.
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but then went on to invalidate the ‘723 patent based on inherent anticipation.304  Rader 
found the ‘196 patent was enabled and, if practiced, would inevitably result in at least 
trace amounts of hemihydrate.305  Thus, he concluded that the record had shown by clear 
and convincing evidence that the ‘196 patent inherently anticipated the ‘723 patent since,
under Schering, inherent anticipation did not require PHOSITA to “recognize the 
inherent disclosure at the time the prior art is created.”306   Additionally, the Court 
refused to save the patent by requiring that Apotex take extraordinary measures to 
practice the prior art without infringing the ‘723 patent.307  In invalidating the ‘723 
patent, Judge Rader reiterated his dicta from Schering that some protection could be 
allowed for the ‘723 hemihydrate, but that SmithKline could not receive a patent over the 
“bare compound.”308
SmithKline signals the Federal Circuit’s wholehearted acceptance of Judge 
Rader’s position on inherent anticipation.  The only exception was Judge Newman, who 
once again dissented to the denial of a rehearing en banc.  Judge Newman objected to the 
Circuit’s decision to reverse the panel regarding public use during clinical trials, while 
leaving the panel’s enlargement of inherent anticipation in place.309  Judge Newman saw
this as an even larger expansion of inherent anticipation because there was “no evidence 
whatsoever that the hemihydrate existed at the time that the anhydrate application was 
filed, and no evidence that such existence would have been recognized by a person of 
304 SmithKline. 403 F.3d. at 1335-1343.
305 Id. at 1344.  
306 Id. at 1343.
307 Id. at 1345.
308 SmithKline, 403 F.3d. at 1346.  Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1381. See also, pg. 17, supra.  
309 SmithKline v. Apotex, 403 F.3d. at 1329, Judge Newman’s dissent from the order declining rehearing en 
banc. 
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skill in the field of the invention.”310 Newman contended Continental Can was still good 
law, and the question should still be whether a substance’s existence would have been 
known by PHOSITA, not whether “it might have lain hidden in minuscule amount, 
undetected, unsuspected, and unknown.”311 “[O]nly after a compound is identified does 
it become subject to patenting; if its existence is not reasonably known to persons of skill 
in the field, its later discovery cannot be retrospectively “inherently anticipated.”312
SmithKline makes sense from a public policy standpoint, but it also appears that 
the Federal Circuit went further than necessary to protect the public.  The new question is 
whether the Court’s new doctrine on inherent anticipation is consistent with the goals of 
patent law, or is it drawing a categorical limitation that refuses patents to discoveries that 
significantly advance science?  The Seaborg case suggested that something which is 
inherently present, but unknowable, is still patentable if it meets all the other eligibility 
requirements of patents.  Judge Newman also made a reasonable suggestion that patents 
be interpreted in a manner that does not prevent the practicing of the prior art.  This issue 
is especially relevant in the area of pharmaceuticals, where it is not always possible to 
understand all the metabolites that may possess utility.  The Hatch –Waxman Act 
acknowledges that pharmaceuticals play a special role in our society. That special role 
can lead to statutory revisions that recognize , not only the role of pharmaceuticals in our 
society, but also the difficulty in claiming metabolites that can possess actual utility and 
offer value to a patent holder.  
III. Hatch-Waxman
310 Id.
311 Id. at 1330.  
312 Id.
56
Congress attempted to address the concerns of both brand name pharmaceutical 
companies and the public through the passage of the “Hatch-Waxman Act.”313  The goal 
of the act was to provide sufficient protection to pharmaceutical companies to spur the 
research and development of new drugs, while also allowing generic drug manufactures 
to quickly bring their drugs to market.314
Pharmaceutical manufacturers were protected by the Hatch-Waxman Act by 
becoming eligible for a patent term restoration.315  Patent extension under §156 is limited 
to a single instance for the active ingredient of a new drug product, and the extension is 
limited to “the time equal to the regulatory review period for the approved product.”316
The extension restoration period for the patent was capped at five years, and total patent 
protection was not permitted to extend beyond fourteen years from the date that the FDA 
approved the new drug application.317  Pharmaceutical manufacturers are entitled to list 
any patents related to a drug in the “Orange Book”, and a generic drug manufacturer must 
address the validity of each of those patents before FDA approval of an abbreviated new 
drug application (ANDA) can be finalized.318  Should a pharmaceutical company sue a 
generic manufacturer for technical infringement after their filing of an ANDA, a thirty 
month stay is granted to the FDA approval process pending the outcome of litigation.319
Subsequent listings in the “Orange Book” can result in consecutive stays which often 
313 The Hatch Waxman Act (The Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984), Codified at 21 U.S.C. §355 (generic drugs) and 35 U.S.C. §156 (c) (patent 
term restoration).  
314 Andrx Pharmaceuticals v. Biovail Corporation, 276 F.3d. 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
315 Arnold Partnership v. Dudas, 362 F.3d. 1338, 1340-1341 (2005).
316 Id. at 1340-1342.  35 U.S.C. §156.
317Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d. 1543, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  35 U.S.C. §156(g)(6)(B)(limiting 
extension to five years), and 35 U.S.C. 156(c)(3)(limiting overall protected time period after FDA approval 
to fourteen years).
318 Adrx, 276 F.3d. at 1371.  21 U.S.C. §355(b)(1) and (c)(2).  
319 Id.  35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(2005).  This section makes the filing of an ANDA technical infringement if the 
patents covering a drug are still valid, regardless of whether any drug is ever sold.
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have the affect of delaying final approval to proposed generic drugs for periods much 
longer than the originally intended thirty months.320  This unintended extension was 
rendered virtually immune from judicial review by the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Mylan, which held that district courts have no statutory authority to shorten the thirty 
month stay granted by an Orange Book listing, but did suggest administrative relief could 
be sought under the Administrative Procedure Act.321  Additionally, the court 
subsequently found in Mylan v. Thompson that no private right of action existed to secure 
the delisting of a questionable patent from the “Orange Book.”322 Although antitrust
action exists, pharmaceuticals companies have proven adept at avoiding such liability.323
The provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act that were intended to protect brand-
name pharmaceutical companies were meant to spur further research and development by 
allowing these companies to maximize their investments in various drugs, however, the 
act was a tradeoff. The benefit that the brand-name pharmaceuticals received was that 
the patent term of their drugs were tolled for the time required to receive regulatory 
320 See FN 61, supra. 
321 Mylan, 276 F.3d. at 1376.  The District Court in this case refused to consider Andrx’s claim that the 
APA could be used to require the FDA to delist patents from the orange-book because Andrx failed to 
plead an APA in their complaint, thus violating the FDA’s right to notice.  Judge Dyk agreed with the 
District Court’s determination that the APA violation could not be considered, but stated that Adrx 
complaint “had [implied] certain procedural facts that may give rise to an APA claim” if properly pleaded, 
Id. at 1374.    
322 Mylan v. Thompson, 268 F.3d. 1323, 1327-1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  
323 See, e.g. SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 383 F.Supp.2d. 686 (E.D. Penn. 2004).  In this case SmithKline 
was sued by Torpharm for antitrust violations arising out of their consecutive listings of patents in the 
“Orange Book” relating to their anti-depressant PAXIL®.  Under the Hatch-Waxman Act the first company 
to file an ANDA that proves the invalidity of a patent receives a 180 day exclusive marketing period, 
during which other generic companies may not market their own generic versions of a drug.  SmithKline 
entered into a licensing agreement with a generic drug company in order to destroy Torpharm’s ability to 
receive the exclusive 180 day marketing period.  The district court found that this agreement alone did not 
constitute an anti-trust injury, although the court did leave in place Torpharm’s tortuous interference claims 
arising under Pennsylvania law.  A problem that still remains is that, due to the lengthy nature of anti-trust 
actions, it is possible that a pharmaceutical may still repeatedly file consecutive patents in the orange book 
that delay the approval of generic drugs until after the original patents have expired.  This alone would 
frustrate Hatch-Waxman’s goal of making generic drugs quickly available to the public.      
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approval, but their overall protection could not extend beyond fourteen years.324  This 
extension could only be granted once and had to be filed prior to the expiration of the 
original patent.325
In exchange the generic companies received an extended experimental use 
privilege so that they could more quickly market generic versions of drugs.326 Prior to 
Hatch-Waxman, pharmaceutical companies received a de facto extension on expired 
patents because generic drug manufacturers were required to conduct their own testing 
program to demonstrate safety and efficacy to the FDA for marketing approval.327
Hatch-Waxman allows generic drug manufacturers to rely on the clinical trial data 
provided to the FDA by the original marketer of a drug in order to fulfill the FDA 
regulatory requirements.328  These applications that rely on a third party’s proof of safety 
and efficacy are known as ANDAs.329 ANDA applicants need only show that the drug 
they seek to market is the bioequivalent of the originally approved drug.330  Also, generic 
drug manufacturers are permitted to “make and use the patented product, even though the 
patent hadn’t yet expired, in order to demonstrate bioequivalence.”331 To further 
encourage the entry of generic drugs into the marketplace, the first generic manufacturer 
to successfully apply for an ANDA receives a 180 day exclusive marketing period, 
during which time this manufacturer and the original manufacturer would exist as 
324 SmithKline, 247 F.Supp.2d at 1019.  35 U.S.C. §156 (2004).  
325 Arnold Partnership, 363 F.3d. at 1340 (2004).  
326 SmithKline, 247 F.Supp. 2d. at 1018.  
327 Merck, 80 F.3d at 1546.
328 Id.  21 U.S.C. §355(j)(7)(B).
329 Merck, 80 F.3d. at 1547.
330 SmithKline, 247 F.Supp. 2d. at 1018.
331 Id.  The “fair use” exemption for testing under 35 U.S.C. §271(e) was recognized by the Supreme Court 
in  Integra Lifesciences v. Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. 193 (2005), 125 S.Ct. 2372.  This protection was found 
to extend to any activities “reasonably related” to obtaining government approval of a device or 
composition, even if the ultimate goals are economic in nature.   
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“duopolists.”332 Through these steps the Hatch-Waxman Act aimed to expedite the 
marketing of generic versions of brand name drugs.333  However, as previously discussed, 
pharmaceuticals have still proved adept at using orange book patent listings to delay the 
entry of generic drugs into the market.  
The provisions of Hatch-Waxman demonstrate that Congress already recognizes 
that pharmaceuticals possess unique qualities, within themselves and to the public, that 
necessitate special treatment.  The patent extension for time lost marketing a drug 
because of lengthy regulatory approval processes is a great example of the extreme 
lengths to which Congress will go to ensure continued research and development.  
Additionally, Congress arguably permits pharmaceutical companies to abuse the “Orange
Book” listing regimen intended to prevent the FDA from approving the manufacture of a 
generic drug still protected by a pa tent.  
Due to the seeming willingness by Congress to take all reasonable steps to allow 
pharmaceutical companies to maximize the value of drug patents, so as to encourage 
future research and development, it is time for Congress to reevaluate the patent law, as 
related to biological and pharmaceutical inventions, in light of Schering and SmithKline.   
The primary problem with the Schering and SmithKline cases is that the Federal Circuit 
in adopting a hard-line rule, which is sensible in light of public policy, has foreclosed 
patents for metabolites that are unrecognized but that provide utility.  T he Schering case 
ultimately prevents any type of patent protection for the true scientific advancement of a 
chemical composition.  This view is not consistent with the goals of patent law because 
patent law is intended to encourage and protect innovation.  There is a significant danger 
332 SmithKline, 247 F.Supp.2d. at 1023.  21 U.S.C. §355(j)(4)(B)(iv) (2003).
333 Merck, 80 F.3d. at 1547.
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that the new rule of inherent anticipation adopted by the Federal Circuit will make 
research and development into metabolites impractical due to the danger that any patents 
gained may be held invalid if any prior art is found have produced that metabolite, 
regardless of whether the metabolite was previously known or in any way related to the 
utility of the prior art.  However, based upon the importance of pharmaceutical and 
biological inventions in society a full term patent may not prove be the preferred solution.  
Congress has determined, as demonstrated by the policy choices made by Hatch-
Waxman, that pharmaceutical compositions need to be treated differently from other 
patented materials due their importance to society though the benefits accorded to the 
overall quality of living.334 Due to these considerations a statutory compromise is
necessary.
IV. Policy Suggestions
The cases of both Schering and SmithKline (Paxil) demonstrate instances where a 
useful metabolite was discovered, but found to be anticipated because the discovery was 
made after the original patent’s critical date.335 However, the Federal Circuit’s adoption 
of a rigid prohibition on metabolites fails to address the complexities that go into the 
discovery of a patentable biological or pharmaceutical invention.  The law of anticipation 
was meant to prevent extensions of patents that would, in turn, prohibit the public from 
practicing an invention without advancing science in return.  Absent a finding that a 
patent applicant is attempting to extend their patent without further advancing science, 
there is a need to examine patent applications for metabolites and other biological 
334 See 35 U.S.C. §154, §156 (2005).  The statute allows for a patent term restoration equal to period of 
regulatory review and approval of a new drug, but capping the total period of protection at fourteen years 
even if a longer term remains on the patent.  
335 Schering, 339 F.3d. 1373;   SmithKline, 403 F.3d. 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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inventions on a case by case basis.  Towards this goal  I will make recommendations on 
how to protect pharmaceutical companies’ discoveries of metabolites, while still 
protecting the public by ensuring that the passing of these discoveries into the public 
domain is not unduly delayed.  A review of the practical implications of both the 
Schering case and the SmithKline (Paxil) case helps to demonstrate the necessity for a 
new statutory regimen for such patents. 
In the case of Schering, an argument can be made that a finding of inherency is 
appropriate because the discovered metabolite, DCL, may have provided some utility to 
the patent, although it is not certain to what degree.336 DCL is a type of antihistamine 
that does not cause drowsiness, and it was covered by the ‘716 patent which issued three 
years after the ‘233 patent.337 The ‘233 patent covers the chemical makeup of Claritin, 
Schering’s antihistamine that was attractive in the market because it did not cause 
drowsiness.338  Upon the expiration of the ‘233 patent, generic manufactures wished to 
manufacture generic versions of this patent, but they were required to assert the invalidity 
of the ‘716 patent because of Schering’s “Orange Book” listing of that patent in 
connection with the ‘233 patent.339 The practical implication of the “Orange  Book” 
listing was that Schering was attempting to prevent generic drug manufacturers from 
practicing the ‘233 patent, even after it had entered the public domain.  
The Federal Circuit was, quite understandably, troubled by this notion.  However, 
in attempting to rectify the situation the Circuit chose to use a sledgehammer against a 
fly.  The listing by Schering in the “Orange Book” of the ‘716 patent in connection with 
336 Id. at 1375.  See also, Section II. A., pp.11-26, supra.  
337 Id. at 1376.
338 Id. at 1375.
339 Id. at 1376.
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the ‘233 patent was quite questionable, but Schering’s other actions do not necessarily 
lead to a conclusion of bad intent.  Most notably, the ‘716 patent was applied for in 1984, 
a mere three years after the ‘233 patent.  If Schering’s intent was to extend the patent of 
the ‘233 patent, they would have been much better served by delaying the application for 
several more years.  Secondly, the court never addressed whether the ‘716 patent 
advanced science.  If the ‘716 patent did advance science, then the notion that a patent 
should be denied categorically is misplaced.  This view receives support from Judge 
Lourie’s dissent, which points out the difficulty of finding all metabolites prior to clinical 
trials, which in themselves may take years to receive approval for.340
Furthermore, if discoveries such as DCL are denied patent protection it is likely 
that companies, such as Schering, will choose in the future to maintain such unpatentable 
advancements as trade secrets, lest a competitor be handed a starting point to reverse 
engineer a competing product before the expiration of the original patent.  If the practical 
result of the Schering decision is to encourage recourse by pharmaceutical companies to 
trade secret, then the policy goals of patent law have not been served because scientific 
advancement will not  become readily accessible to the public.341 Lastly, despite the 
complications brought on by Mylan v. Thompson342 and Andrx v. Biovail,343 the simplest 
340 Schering, 348 F.3d at 995-996. 
341 Schering’s counsel alludes to this in their combined request for panel and en banc rehearing.  They state 
their belief that protection for the purified forms of a drug would be insufficient because “copyists will 
design pro-drugs to convert into DCL in vivo after administration.”  Combined Petition for Panel 
Rehearing and rehearing En Banc by Plaintiff-Appellant.  2003 WL 24033460 at 12.  The concern stated 
by counsel is that others will find a way to administer DCL without infringing the patent for the pure 
substance allowed by Judge Rader.  However, the greater danger is that pharmaceutical manufacturers will 
not investigate metabolites because no protection can be afforded through patents.  This will therefore not 
bring the metabolites into the public knowledge, and no alternative methods of creating such a metabolite 
will be created because they will be unprotectable.  Judge Newman’s suggestion of allowing the patenting 
of DCL, without permitting the patent to cover prior art that may result in the DCL, would allow Schering  
to have limited protection over all new compositions that may create DCL and still allow competitors to 
practice all prior art in the public domain that results in DCL.       
342 Mylan, 268 F.3d. 1323.
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solution to problems such as these is to refuse to permit a pharmaceutical company to 
block generic manufacturers’ production of drugs that have passed into the public 
domain.  This position, put forward by Judge Newman, is consistent with the current 
statute that permits the FDA to approve an ANDA once successful litigation has been 
concluded by generic drug manufacturers, so rapid summary dismissals of such claims 
are the best solution to this complicated problem.344
The SmithKline Paxil case provides an example of the potential pitfalls of the 
Schering rule.  In this case SmithKline originally received a patent for paroxetine (the 
‘196 patent), but later received a second patent for the hemihydrate form of paroxetine 
(the ‘723 patent).345  The ‘723 patent was received after the ‘196 material “morphed” into 
a more stable hemihydrate state, from the less stable anhydrous form of the drug.346 The 
primary value of the hemihydrate form of the drug was not to the patient because the 
record did not indicate that the hemihydrate form of the drug contributed to its utility.
Rather, the utility of the hemihydrate was that it was more easily manufactured in a stable 
pseudo-polymorph form. 
However, SmithKline’s position in litigation was that generic manufacturers 
should not be permitted to practice even the ‘196 patent because it would invariably 
contain ‘723 material, due to seeding, and that ingesting the ‘196 material would 
inevitably lead to small amounts of the ‘723 material in metabolite form.347  The court 
ultimately concluded that the inevitable creation of small amounts of ‘723 material within 
343 Andrx, 276 F.3d. 1368.
344 The problem is further complicated by consecutive listings of patents in the “orange book” which results 
in consecutive stays.  See Schering, 348 F.3d. at 993-994.




a patient’s stomach made that patent invalid as inherently anticipated.348  This position, 
once again, is understandable given SmithKline’s unreasonable position in the litigation, 
but it fails to grant SmithKline protection for the advancement that the ‘723 patent 
recognized.  The value of the ‘723 patent was not the metabolite formed in the patient’ 
stomach but, rather, the value was in the efficiency of manufacture as compared to the 
‘196 material.  
Through its ruling in the SmithKline case the Federal Circuit has created a
troubling situation that presents a substantial danger to innovation.  Consider the 
following hypothetical:  Company A discovers a metabolite that proves extremely 
valuable at treating a common condition.  This metabolite is patentable under 35 U.S.C. 
§§101-103, and Company A is granted a patent.  After the FDA has approved Company 
A’s New Drug Application (NDA) the drug is marketed and becomes extremely popular.  
Generic Company B then files an ANDA asserting that the patent for the metabolite is 
invalid.  Company B’s basis for their claim of invalidity is that prior art Z has been found 
to have produced the patented metabolite as a byproduct.  The metabolite in question in 
no way contributed to the utility of prior art Z and was undetected in the prior art until 
Company B recently began scouring all prior art for a way to invalidate Company’s A
patent on the new blockbuster metabolite.  Under the Federal Circuit’s inherent 
anticipation rule in Schering and SmithKline the new patent on the metabolite should be 
invalidated.  The practical result of this rule is that Company A will not invest in the 
research and development of metabolites because they will not be able to patent such 
discoveries, making it highly unlikely that they can recoup their investment. Instead, a 
windfall will be had by the generic companies who will be permitted to piggyback on the 
348 Id.
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work of brand-name pharmaceuticals to a degree not anticipated or intended by Hatch-
Waxman. In this way the ruling in SmithKline undercuts the purposes of patent law and
encourages recourse to trade secret, if pharmaceuticals choose to invest in metabolite 
research at all.
There currently exists a need to balance the public’s right to have access to 
generic drugs, while still ensuring that pharmaceuticals receive an adequate return on 
their investment so that they will continue research and development. My first suggestion 
is simple: alter the law to prevent consecutive listings in the Orange Book, while also 
granting district courts the power to order delisting.  Hopefully, courts will also begin to 
dismiss as meritless cases that attempt to prevent parties from practicing inventions that 
have fallen into the public domain, even if their use leads to the production of a patented 
product.  
Secondly, I suggest a middle ground for the patenting of metabolites by creating a 
limited exception to the double-patenting rule.  First it should be asked whether a 
metabolite would be patentable but for inherent anticipation.  Then it should be 
determined whether the party acted promptly to patent the metabolite upon its discovery.
This would prevent the gamesmanship that both Judges Newman and Rader are 
concerned about by holding a party accountable if they had knowledge superior to that of 
PHOSITA.  If the company acted diligently, it should then be asked whether PHOSITA 
would have recognized the trait prior to the critical date of the original patent.  If 
PHOSITA would have recognized the trait prior to the critical date of the original patent 
then the appropriate step would have been for the applicant to receive a patent with a 
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terminal disclaimer; and further protection should be refused because to allow otherwise
would merely extend a patent without reciprocal benefit to the public.  
If PHOSITA would not have recognized the discovery, then additional protection 
is appropriate if science is sufficiently advanced.  I suggest that a patent be granted that 
will run for the length of the original patent, plus an additional five years after the 
termination of the protected term under Hatch-Waxman, and applicants for this patent 
would not be limited to the original patent owner. This would encourage research and 
development by others of patented material and any discovery would likely benefit the 
public.  However, this patent would be limited in scope so as not to render anyone who is
unknowingly practicing the metabolite, or practicing the prior art, an infringer; and only 
one five year extension could be obtained, but this extension could run consecutive to an 
extension under Hatch-Waxman if the patents are owned by the same party.  The patent 
could be used to prevent future competitors from entering the market if they had not 
already developed their composition at the time the extension patent was filed.  Such an
extended patent also need not affect the ability of pharmaceutical companies to receive 
the patents Judge Rader spoke of in Schering over pure forms, pharmaceutical 
compositions, or for a method of administering, since this a limited exception to the 
double patenting rule, and obviousness should be judged from the original patent, not the 
limited five year patent.
Congress needs to address the fact that the discovery of metabolites is not 
analogous to the situation in General Electric, where a party attempted to receive an 
additional patent on an invention that had already passed to the public domain.349  The 
discovery of a metabolite constitutes a substantial discovery that advances science and 
349 See FN 12, supra.
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holds the potential of leading to the development of alternative medications that bring 
about the preferred metabolites. The new rules suggested would allow pharmaceutical 
companies who discover useful metabolites to more fully exploit their discovery so that 
the resources will exist for further research and development.  The benefit to the public 
would be that the metabolite that causes a desirable result would become generally 
known so that other companies could begin their own research and development to 
determine other ways to practice the patented metabolite; as well as allowing generic 
companies to practice the protected metabolite after a delay of five years, as opposed to 
the twenty years that they would normally endure were a full patent given to such a 
discovery.
V. Conclusion
The problems associated with the patenting of metabolites are fairly new because 
the technology and incentive to develop such inventions only appeared within the past 
several decades.  As science comes to better understand the function of the human body 
and its reactions to foreign agents such as pharmaceuticals, the time has come to create a 
sound policy that directly addresses the patenting of metabolites.  This policy needs to 
balance both the interest of the public to receive generic versions of pharmaceuticals, as 
well as the needs of pharmaceutical manufacturers to continue producing the new drugs 
that will improve the general standard of public health.  I believe that a minor extension 
to an existing patent, to cover recently discovered metabolites, makes sense and will 
serve both these goals by creating only a minor delay in receiving generic drugs, but 
improving pharmaceutical companies’ ability to fully exploit a discovery.  I believe that 
while this view will not allow either side claim to victory, it will address the major 
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underlying concerns addressed by both Judge Newman and Judge Rader that new 
discoveries be protected and that public policy be secured.
